Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3.

[420] Columbia, driving them back, with great loss on their side, whenever they advanced. When, late in the afternoon, he heard of Stanley's peril, he took Ruger's division, and hastened to his support, leaving orders for the remainder of his force to follow. He encountered some detachments of cavalry on the way, and when he arrived at Spring Hill, he found the main body of the Confederates bivouacked within half a mile of the road over which his army must pass. He left them undisturbed. His troops passed by at midnight, and pushed on northward, closely pursued, and sometimes severely pressed after the day dawned. Hour after hour skirmishing went on, while the patriots gradually moved northward. during that day and night, and early the following morning

Nov. 30, 1864.

they were in a strong position at Franklin, on the Harpeth River, where some stirring events had occurred the previous year.¹ There Schofield halted on the southern edge of the village, in order that his trains, then choking the road for miles, might be taken across the Harpeth and put well on their way toward Nashville, eighteen miles distant. It was better to give battle there, with this encumbrance out of the way, than to be compelled to fight, as he doubtless would that day or the next, with his trains close at hand.

Schofield's Headquarters.2

Schofield was satisfied that his foes were concentrated directly in his rear; for his cavalry, following the Lewisburg pike several miles eastward of his line of march, had encountered no enemy. He disposed his troops accordingly in a curved line south and west of the town, the flanks resting on the Harpeth; and then cast up a line of slight intrenchments along their entire front. The cavalry, with the Third Division of the Fourth Corps (Wood's), were posted on the north bank of the river, and Fort Granger, on a bluff,³ commanded the gently rolling plain over which Hood must advance in a direct attack. Within the entire lines around Franklin, Schofield had not to exceed eighteen thousand men, when Hood, at four o'clock in the afternoon,

Nov. 30.

came up with all his force, and assailed the Nationals, with the intention and expectation of crushing them with one heavy blow. He had assured his soldiers that, if they should break through Schofield's line, they would disperse or destroy his army, capture his trains, drive Thomas out of Tennessee and might march on, without opposition, to the Ohio River.

Hood had formed his columns for attack behind a line of dense woods; Stewart on his right, next the Harpeth, Cheatham on his left, and Lee in the rear, in reserve. A greater part of his cavalry, led by Forrest, was on his right, and the remainder were on his left. Thus prepared, the Confederates