Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3.

[132] an almost bloodless victory, scattered them over an immense space of rough country, to operate on the rear and flank of what he supposed to be a flying adversary. He ordered Crittenden to call his brigades from across the river, near Chattanooga, and leaving one of them there to garrison the town, push on to the East Chickamauga Valley and the railway to Ringgold or Dalton to intercept the march of Buckner from East Tennessee, or strike the Confederate rear, as circumstances might determine. Thomas, who had just passed through Stevens's and Cooper's gaps of Lookout Mountain, into McLemore's Cove, was directed to push through Dug Gap of Pigeon Mountain, and fall upon the supposed flank of the Confederates at Lafayette. At the same time McCook was to press on farther south, to Broomtown Valley, to turn Bragg's left. These movements were promptly made, and revealed the alarming truth to Rosecrans. His cavalry on the right, supported by McCook's corps, descended Lookout Mountain, reconnoitered Broomtown Valley as far as Alpine, and discovered that Bragg had not retreated on Rome. Crittenden moved rapidly to Ringgold, where, on pushing Wilder forward to Tunnel Hill, near Buzzard's Roost (where he skirmished heavily), it was discovered that the Confederates, in strong force, were on his front, and menacing his communications; and when Negley, with his division of Thomas's corps, approached Dug Gap, he found it securely guarded by a force so overwhelming, that when, on the following morning, Baird came to his aid, both together could make no impression, and they fell back to the main body.

Rosecrans was at last satisfied that Bragg, instead of fleeing before him, was gathering force at Lafayette, opposite his center, to strike a heavy blow at the scattered Army of the Cumberland. He saw, too, that its position was a perilous one. Its wings, one at Lee and Gordon's Mill, on the Chickamauga, and the other at Alpine, were full forty miles apart, and offered Bragg a rare opportunity to terribly cripple, if not destroy or capture his foe. But the golden opportunity too soon passed. Rosecrans, on perceiving the danger, issued orders for the concentration of his forces in the Chickamauga Valley, in the vicinity of Crawfish Spring, about half-way between Chattanooga and Lafayette. Crittenden, alarmed by threatened danger to his communications, had already made

Sept. 12, 1863.

a rapid flank movement in that direction, from Ringgold, covered by Wilder's brigade, which was compelled to skirmish heavily at Lett's tan-yard, with Confederate cavalry, under Pegram and Armstrong. Thomas crossed the upper end of the Missionaries' Ridge, and moved toward the Spring; and McCook, after much difficulty in moving up and down Lookout Mountain, joined Thomas on the 17th. Granger's reserves were called up from Bridgeport, and encamped at Rossville; a division under General Steedman was ordered up from the Nashville and Chattanooga railway, and a brigade, led by Colonel D. McCook, came from Columbia. On the night of Friday, the 18th,

Sept.

when it was positively known to Rosecrans that troops from Virginia were joining Bragg, the concentration of his army was completed, excepting the reserves at Rossville and cavalry at Blue Bird's Gap of Pigeon Mountain, and at Dougherty's Gap that separates the latter from Lookout Mountain. The divisions of Wood, Van Cleve, Palmer, Reynolds, Johnson, Baird, and Brannan, about thirty thousand in number,