Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3.

[457]

Sherman had advised General Grant that it was his intention “to undertake, at one stride,” after leaving Savannah, “to make Goldsboroa, and open

Hardee's Headquarters in Charleston.1

communications with the sea, by the New Berne railroad,” and for that purpose, he sent Colonel W. W. Wright, superintendent of military roads, to New Berne to prepare for extending the railway from that place to Goldsboroa. Meanwhile, during the delay caused by the floods, some feints were made from Pocotaligo of an advance on Charleston, and thereby Hardee was kept from interfering with Sherman's preparations for his proposed “stride.” Finally, when the waters had somewhat subsided, and every thing was in readiness for an advance, the posts at the Tullifinny and Coosawhatchie rivers were abandoned as useless and the troops a long the Charleston and Savannah railway were concentrated at Pocotaligo.

Sherman's whole army moved forward on the first of February, nearly in a due north course, toward Columbia, the capital of South Carolina. All the roads in that direction had, for weeks, been held by Wheeler's cavalry, who had employed a large force of negroes in felling trees and burning bridges in the expected pathway of Sherman's march. In the face of these obstacles, and with a well-organized pioneer force to remove them, the Nationals moved forward. Slocum, with Kilpatrick's cavalry comprising the left wing, pressed through the wet swamps from Sister's Ferry toward Barnwell, threatening Augusta; while the right wing, keeping westward of the Salkhatchie River, made for the crossings of that stream at River's and Beaufort bridges, for the purpose of pushing on to the Edisto River, and thus flanking Charleston. These movements, at the outset, so distracted the foe with doubt whether Augusta or Charleston was Sherman's chief objective, that his forces were divided and weakened in the service of watching.

This formidable invasion, produced wide-spread alarm. When Sherman was lying at Savannah, the speculative opinion that he would attempt it, was met by the assurance and general belief that the march of a great army, with all its trains, across the swampy regions of South Carolina in midwinter, was a physical impossibility. Yet the fact that the National forces had so often overthrown all such speculations by actual achievements, had taught leaders wisdom; and, to prepare for any emergency, Governor Magrath² had, by proclamation, summoned

Dec. 29, 1864.

to