October 27, 1863. |
November. |
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Sherman's troops engaged in repairing the road were continually annoyed by Confederate cavalry under General S. D. Lee, whose force, about five thousand strong, was composed of the brigades of Roddy and Ferguson.
With these, Osterhaus's division, supported by M. L. Smith's (J. E. Smith's covering the working parties), was constantly skirmishing.
Finally, Lee attempted, near Tuscumbia, to dispute the further advance of the Nationals, when General Frank Blair took the advance divisions and soon swept away the opposing force.
On that day Sherman received a dispatch from Grant, then at Chattanooga, who, fearing the Confederates, reported to be gathering in force at Cleveland on his left, might break through his lines and make a dash on Nashville, ordered Sherman to drop all work on the railway and move with his entire force to Stevenson.
He assured Sherman that in the event of the Confederates moving on Nashville, his forces were “the only ones at command that could beat them there.”
1
Fortunately, Sherman's forethought had caused a supply of means, at this critical moment, for his army to cross the Tennessee River, a movement which the general had expected to be very difficult, with the Confederates in strong force hovering around him. He had requested Admiral Porter to send up gun-boats from Cairo, to assist him in that perilous task.
He did so, and on the day when, in obedience to Grant's call, Sherman marched to Eastport, on the river, he found two gun-boats there.
Three other vessels soon arrived, and on the 1st of November he crossed and pushed on eastward, Blair covering his rear.
He went by way of Fayetteville, Winchester, and Decherd, in Tennessee, and then down to Stevenson and Bridgeport, arriving at the latter place on the 14th.
On the following day he reported to Grant at Chattanooga, in person.
Grant had been somewhat anxious about Burnside's situation, for he could not send him aid when Longstreet advanced, though strongly importuned to do so, especially by Halleck, who deplored the danger of losing Knoxville, and with it East Tennessee.
But Grant had plans for relief, which he could not communicate to the General-in-Chief, but which were perfectly satisfactory to Mr. Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War, then at Headquarters in Chattanooga.
If, as Grant believed he could, Burnside should hold out at Knoxville until Sherman's approaching re-enforcements should arrive, he felt certain that a double victory might be obtained, for he could then scatter the forces of Bragg on the Missionaries' Ridge, and by such blow possibly so demoralize and weaken Longstreet's force as to compel him to raise the siege of Knoxville.
He sent Colonel Wilson, of his staff, accompanied by Mr. Dana, to Knoxville, to communicate his plans to Burnside, and immediately after Sherman's arrival he proceeded to put them into execution.
The two leaders proceeded, together with General Smith, in a personal reconnoissance of Bragg's position, and a plan of attack was speedily perfected.
Grant's first movement was to deceive Bragg into the belief that he was to be attacked in heavy force on his left.
For this purpose Sherman's troops were put in motion at Bridgeport.
Ewing's division moved to Shellmound,
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