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its capture by Fagan, and succeeded.
It was a terrible march from Jenkins's Ferry over the swampy country, the half-famished men dragging cannon and caissons over corduroy roads they had made for the purpose, for the animals were so exhausted that they could not draw even the wagons, which had to be destroyed.
A supply-train met them, and on the 2d of May the broken and dispirited troops entered Little Rock.
So ended, in all its parts, the disastrous campaign against Shreveport.
Its result caused much disappointment and dissatisfaction; and General Banks was specially blamed for not pressing forward after his victory at Pleasant Hill.
The narrative here given, drawn from authentic sources,1 and the reasons offered by General Banks in his report, seem to the writer to be his sufficient justification in the judgment of candid observers.2 He was nowise responsible for the radically defective plan of the campaign, and his troops evidently did all that it was possible for them to do under the circumstances.
1 The authorities from which the facts of this narrative have been chiefly derived, are the Reports of General Banks and his subordinates; of Admiral Porter and his subordinates; of the Confederate General E. Kirby Smith and his subordinates; the narratives of newspaper correspondents, and the manuscript diaries of General T. Kilby Smith and Brevet Brigadier-General George Bernard Drake. The latter was the Adjutant-General of Banks's forces engaged in the Red River expedition, and, at the request of the writer, kindly furnished him with a copy of his diary.
2 The chief reasons offered were: (1.) The difficulty in bringing his trains on the road toward Grand Ecore in time to move quickly after the flying Confederates; (2.) A lack of water for man or beast in that region, excepting such as the wells afforded; (3.) The fact that all surplus ammunition and supplies of the army were on board the transports sent up to Loggy Bayou, and the impossibility of knowing whether these had reached their destination; (4.) The falling of the river, which imperiled the naval part of the expedition; and (5.) The report of a scouting party, on the day of the battle, that no tidings could be heard of the fleet. “These considerations,” said Banks, “the absolute deprivation of water for man or beast, the exhaustion of rations, and the failure to effect a connection with the fleet on the river, made it necessary for the army, although victorious in the struggle through which it had just passed, to retreat to a point where it would be certain of communicating with the fleet, and where it would have an opportunity for reorganization. The shattered condition of the Thirteenth Army Corps and the cavalry made this indispensable.”
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