June 1864. |
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object north of Richmond, but had failed to do so. He was disappointed, but not disheartened, by his failure and his enormous losses, which were to Lee's as three to one;1 and he proceeded to carry out, as far as possible, the remainder of his original design.2 He had seriously crippled his adversary, who lacked means for recuperation, and he now determined to starve him into submission.
Having considered all the contingencies incident to the bold movement of throwing his army to the south side of the James, he feared no mischief from it, but anticipated much benefit.
On the day after the battle, Grant caused slight intrenchments to be thrown up in front of his line, and that night the Confederates made a furious assault on; that front, but were quickly repulsed at every point.
On the following day an assault was made on the National left (Smyth's brigade, of Hancock's corps), with the same result.
Meanwhile the army, preparatory to its march to the James, was gradually moved toward the left by the withdrawal of corps in that direction; and on the night of the 6th,
a sharp but unsuccessful assault was made upon the right, then held by Burnside.
On the following morning there was a brief armistice, for the purpose of gathering up the dead between the two lines, which had lain there four days; and before night Grant's line was extended to the Chickahominy, and Sheridan was dispatched, with two divisions of cavalry, to more effectually destroy the railways in Lee's rear, and render Washington more secure.3 He struck and broke the Richmond and Fredericksburg road at Chesterfield Station, and then, pushing across the upper branches of the North Anna, smote the Virginia Central railway at Trevilian's Station, where he expected the co-operation of General Hunter.
That leader, as we have seen,4 was at Staunton, and Sheridan was left to deal, alone, with the gathering Confederates on the railway.
At Trevilian's he encountered and routed some horsemen under Hampton, and then destroyed the road almost to Louisa Court-House, where he was attacked by a much larger force.
After a contest, he was compelled to retrace his steps to Trevilian's, where he fought a sanguinary battle, and then withdrew.
He swept around, by Spottsylvania Court-House and Guiney's Station, to White House, and rejoined Grant's army, having lost during his raid over seven hundred men, and captured nearly four
1 The entire loss of men in this campaign, from the 4th of May to the 12th of June, when the troops proceeded to cross the James River, was about 60,000, while that of the Confederates was not more than 20,000. A tabular statement by Mr. Swinton, in his Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, page 491, tells the losses in the battles and attendant movements, as follows: Battles of the Wilderness, 29,410; of Spottsylvania Court-House, 10,831; of the North Anna, 1,607; and of Cool Arbor, 18,153. Total, 54,551. To this number must be added the losses in the Ninth Corps (Burnside's, which, until the Battle of Cool Arbor, was independent of Meade's command), estimated at 5,000, makes the grand total about 60,000. The loss in officers was about 8,000.
2 “My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond, if possible. Then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south, if he should retreat. After the battle of The Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life, then, than I was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond.” --Report of Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, of the Armies of the United States--1864-65, July 22, 1865.
3 Grant's determination to transfer his army to the south side of the James River-startled the authorities at Washington with fears that Lee might suddenly turn back and seize that city. Grant had no fears on that account. He knew that the country between Lee's shattered army and Washington was thoroughly exhausted by the troops that had just passed over it; and had Lee attempted such a movement, Grant could have sent troops from the James, by way of the Potomac, for the protection of the Capital, much sooner than Lee could have marched upon it.
4 See page 815.
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