Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3.

[382] opposite side a host of men were piling fortifications, with a determination to dispute the passage of their foe. General Thomas's force lay at Paice's Ferry, McPherson's right rested on the river at the mouth of the Nickajack, and Schofield was in reserve on the Sandtown road. Heavy skirmishing on the 5th satisfied Sherman that he could gain no advantage by attacking Johnston in his works, so he proceeded to turn him out of them in the usual way. Schofield was sent, in rapid march, to the National left, and quickly crossed the Chattahoochee

July 7, 1864.

at Powell's Ferry, where he surprised the guard, captured a gun, intrenched himself on commanding hills on the left bank of the river, and constructed a pontoon and a trestle bridge across it. At the same time General Garrard moved on Roswell, and destroyed factories there in which cloth was manufactured for the insurgents.

Schofield's position commanded good roads running eastward, and he soon found himself supported by Howard, who laid a pontoon bridge at Power's Ferry, two miles below, crossed over, and took a commanding position on the right of the Army of the Ohio. At the same time there was a general movement

July 9.

of Sherman's forces from right to left, and thereby Johnston was compelled to abandon his position on each side of the river. He drew his entire army to the left bank of the stream, and took position on a new line that covered Atlanta, its left resting or the Chattahoochee, and its right on Peachtree Creek. On the 10th of July, or sixty-five days from the time he put his army in motion southward, Sherman was master of the country north and west of the river upon which he was resting — of nearly one-half of Georgia-and had accomplished one of the major objects of the campaign, namely, the advancement of the National lines from the Tennessee to the Chattahoochee.

The possession of Atlanta, the key-point of military advantage in the campaign in that region, was to be the next prize for which the contending armies were to struggle. It had been, previously, well fortified; and now Johnston's forces were employing their utmost skill and strength to make that post absolutely impregnable against Sherman's army. In that labor Johnston was assiduously engaged, when he was suddenly deprived of command. The Conspirators at Richmond had become exceedingly nervous because of Sherman's steady advance southward, and were dissatisfied with Johnston's policy, which regarded the salvation of his army. as of more importance than the possession of posts. He well knew that if his army should be destroyed, there could be no hope indulged that another could be raised, for the country was nearly exhausted of able-bodied men, and therefore it was of vital importance to spare the troops. Johnston had certainly done nobly in the campaign with his inferior force; and the energy with which he had used it, whenever prudence would counsel vigorous action, may be inferred from the fact that when he reached the defenses of Atlanta, he had lost about one-fourth of the army with which he left Dalton.¹ Experts say that he had managed the campaign with the greatest skill, and for the best interests of the Confederacy; but this fact the reckless and conceited Davis, and his