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before he could successfully resist the furious onset of
Jackson,
Hooker ordered its withdrawal behind his works at
Chancellorsville.
The retreat was made in good order, the
Confederates following close upon the rear of the Nationals.
That night the respective chief commanders held councils of war,
Hooker at his Headquarters in Chancellor's house, and
Lee at his head.
quarters under some pine trees where the
Confederate line crossed the plank road.
Hooker's position for defense was a strong one.
Around the
Chancellor House was a small clearing, within a dense wood, filled, as we have observed, with a tangled undergrowth.
In the woods he had constructed breastworks of logs, with trees felled in front so as to form a strong
abatis. His cannon commanded these woods, and swept the approaching roads.
The question at the council was, Shall we contract and strengthen our lines, and wait for an attack?
or, Shall we assail the
Confederate position in full force in the morning?
General Warren,
Hooker's senior engineer officer, and others, were in favor of the offensive.
Hooker preferred the defensive attitude, and the latter was chosen.
Preparations for a struggle in the morning were then made.
The
National line extended from the
Rappahannock to the
Wilderness Church, two miles west of
Chancellorsville.
Meade's corps, with a division of
Couch's, formed the left;
Slocum's and a division of
Sickles's the center, and
Howard's the right, with
Pleasanton's cavalry near.
The Confederate line extended from the
Mine road on their right to the
Catharine Furnace on the left, having the
Virginian cavalry of
Owen and
Wickham on the right, and
Stuart's and a part of
Fitzhugh Lee's on the left, at the
Furnace.
McLaws's forces occupied the ridge on the east of the
Big Meadow Swamp, and
Anderson continued the line to the left of
McLaws.
Such was, the general disposition of the opposing forces on the morning of the 2d of May.
Lee was satisfied that his situation was a perilous one, and he was unwilling to risk the danger of making a direct attack upon
Hooker.
His chief counselor was the bold
Jackson, who proposed a secret flank movement with his entire corps present, on the
National right, so as to fall upon
Hooker's rear.
Lee hesitated because he would have only the divisions of
Anderson and
McLaw s left to oppose both
Hooker and
Sedgwick, should the latter cross the river and attack.
To thus divide his army in the
presence of superior numbers might imperil its existence; yet, so much did
Lee lean upon
Jackson as adviser and executor, that he consented and the bold movement was at once begun.
With full twenty-five thousand men,