Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3.

[540] might be cut at any hour. He also perceived the necessity of strengthening his right, to avert the impending shock of battle. He also felt the necessity of maintaining his extended line of works covering Petersburg and Richmond. Ignorant of the fact that Grant had withdrawn a greater portion of the Army of the James from the North side of the River, he left Longstreet's Corps, eight thousand strong, to guard the defenses of Richmond, until it was too late. Mahon's division, of Hill's Corps, was kept in front of the National lines at Bermuda hundred, while the divisions of Wilcox, Pickett, Bushrod Johnson, and the remnant of Ewell's Corps, commanded by Gordon, held the lines before Petersburg. Drawing from these as many as prudence would allow, Lee concentrated a force about fifteen thousand strong, and with these and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, he hastened, during the stormy night of the 29th and 30th, to place them in position in front of the Fifth and Second Corps. All night long they toiled in the drenching rain, and were not ready for battle when the day dawned. Fortunately for them, the rain made the roads so almost impassable, that Grant's infantry, though ready to strike, did little more that day

March 30, 1865.

than to perfect their formation and connection. Sheridan sent a part of his cavalry, under Devin, supported by General Davies, to the five Forks; but the works there were too strongly armed and. Manned to be ridden over, and his troops, drenched by rain and soiled by mud, were driven back to Dinwiddie Court-House, where they encamped that night.

the storm had ceased on the morning of the 30th,

March.

but the ground was so wet and soft, that Grant proposed to remain quiet a little longer. Lee had determined otherwise. He was in a desperate strait, and it was important for him to act without unnecessary delay. He had resolved to make another effort to break through the National line at the Point where he had massed the great body of his troops. His cavalry, which had been posted far to his right, on Stony Creek, and had become isolated by Sheridan's sudden advance to Dinwiddie Court-House, had made a wide circuit westward, and were coming in, so that, on the morning after the storm, he was prepared to strike. Warren's Corps was then westward of the Boydton road, and pressed on the extreme right of the Confederate works on the White Oak road.

the divisions of Ayres, Crawford, and Griffin were en echelon, Ayres in front, and Griffin in the rear. Sheridan was too far distant to form a covering for Warren's flank. In this delicate and exposed position, the Fifth Corps, with skirmishers out in the direction of the White Oak road, and with Winthrop's brigade, of Ayres's division, well advanced in support of them, received an unexpected and stunning blow. It fell upon Ayres's rear, causing his division to go back in great confusion upon Crawford's, which was broken in consequence of the recoil. There was, for a brief space, promise of perfect success for Lee, but his hopes soon faded. Griffin's division stood firm. It stemmed the torrent of assailants, while Ayres and Crawford rallied their columns behind it, and very soon Warren was enabled to assume the offensive. He made a counter-charge, and in so doing was nobly supported by miles's division, sent by Humphreys from the Second Corps, who marched in on Warren's right, and struck the Confederates on their left flank. They were driven back behind their intrenchments