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To such a man the
end is not clear; but it is clear to one who has
already faced the difficulties.Further, one who has heard all the conflicting
theories, like one who has heard both sides in a lawsuit, is
necessarily more competent to judge.
The first
difficulty is concerned with the subjects
1 which we discussed in our prefatory remarks. (1.) Does the
study of the causes belong to one science or to more than one?
2(2.)
Has that science only to contemplate the first principles of
substance, or is it also concerned with the principles which all use
for demonstration—e.g. whether it is possible at the same
time to assert and deny one and the same thing, and other similar
principles?
3And if it is concerned with substance, (3.) is there one science
which deals with all substances, or more than one; and if more than
one, are they all cognate, or should we call some of them "kinds of
Wisdom" and others something different?
4This too is a question which demands inquiry: (iv.) should we hold
that only sensible substances exist, or that there are other besides?
And should we hold that there is only one class of non-sensible
substances, or more than one (as do those who posit the Forms and the
mathematical objects as intermediate between the Forms and sensible
things)?
5These
questions, then, as I say, must be considered; and also (v.) whether
our study is concerned only with substances,
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or also with the essential attributes
of substance;and further,
with regard to Same and Other, and Like and Unlike and Contrariety,
and Prior and Posterior, and all other such terms which dialecticians
try to investigate, basing their inquiry merely upon popular opinions;
we must consider whose province it is to study all of these.Further, we must consider all
the essential attributes of these same things, and not merely what
each one of them is, but also whether each one has one opposite
6; and (vi.) whether the first
principles and elements of things are the genera under which they fall
or the pre-existent parts into which each thing is divided; and if the
genera, whether they are those which are predicated ultimately of
individuals, or the primary genera—e.g., whether "animal" or
"man" is the first principle and the more independent of the
individual.
7Above all we must
consider and apply ourselves to the question (7.) whether there is any
other cause
per se besides matter, and if so whether it
is dissociable from matter, and whether it is numerically one or
several; and whether there is anything apart from the concrete thing
(by the concrete thing I mean matter together with whatever is
predicated of it) or nothing; or whether there is in some cases but
not in others; and what these cases are.
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