[1017a]
[1]
and all are one generically which
are one formally, but such as are one generically are not all one
formally, although they are one analogically; and such as are one
analogically are not all one generically.It is obvious
also that "many" will have the opposite meanings to "one." Some things
are called "many" because they are not continuous; others because
their matter (either primary or ultimate) is formally divisible;
others because the definitions of their essence are more than
one."Being" means (1.) accidental being, (2.)
absolute being. (1.) E.g., we say that the upright person "is"
cultured, and that the man "is" cultured, and that the cultured person
"is" a man; very much as we say that the cultured person builds,
because the builder happens to be cultured, or the cultured person a
builder; for in this sense "X is Y" means that Y is an accident of
X.And so it is with
the examples cited above; for when we say that "the man is cultured"
and "the cultured person is a man" or "the white is cultured" or "the
cultured is white," in the last two cases it is because both
predicates are accidental to the same subject, and in the first case
because the predicate is accidental to what is ; and we
say that "the cultured is a man" because "the cultured" is accidental
to a man.(Similarly
"not-white" is said to "be," because the subject of which "not-white"
is an accident, is .)
[20]
These, then, are the senses in which things are
said to "be" accidentally: either because both predicates belong to
the same subject, which is ; or because the predicate
belongs to the subject, which is ; or because the subject
to which belongs that of which it is itself predicated itself
is .(2.) The senses of essential being are
those which are indicated by the figures of predication1; for "being" has as many senses as there
are ways of predication. Now since some predicates indicate (a) what a
thing is, and others its (b) quality, (c) quantity, (d) relation, (e)
activity or passivity, (f) place, (g) time, to each of these
corresponds a sense of "being."There is no difference between "the man is
recovering" and "the man recovers"; or between "the man is walking" or
"cutting" and "the man walks" or "cuts"; and similarly in the other
cases.(3.) Again, "to be" and
"is" mean that a thing is true, and "not to be" that it is
false.Similarly too
in affirmation and negation; e.g., in "
Socrates is cultured" "is" means that this is true;
or in "Socrates is not-white"
that this is true; but in "the diagonal is not commensurable"2"is not" means that the statement is
false.
1 The categories. For the full list of these see Aristot. Categories 1b 25-27.
2 Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.2.15.
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