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[1088a]
[1]
of qualities as a
quality, and of quantities as a quantity.(The measure is indivisible, in the former
case in kind, and in the latter to our senses.) This shows that unity
is not any independent substance. And this is reasonable; because
unity denotes a measure of some plurality, and number denotes a
measured plurality and a plurality of measures. (Hence too it stands
to reason that unity is not a number; for the measure is not measures,
but the measure and unity are starting-points.)The measure must always be something
which applies to all alike; e.g., if the things are horses, the
measure is a horse; if they are men, the measure is a man; and if they
are man, horse and god, the measure will presumably be an animate
being, and the number of them animate beings.If the things are "man," "white" and
"walking," there will scarcely be a number of them, because they all
belong to a subject which is one and the same in number; however,
their number will be a number of genera, or some other such
appellation. Those1 who regard the unequal as a
unity, and the dyad as an indeterminate compound of great and small,
hold theories which are very far from being probable or possible. For
these terms represent affections and attributes, rather than
substrates, of numbers and magnitudes—"many" and "few"
applying to number, and "great" and "small" to
magnitude—
[20]
just as odd and even, smooth and rough, straight and crooked, are
attributes.Further,
in addition to this error, "great" and "small" and all other such
terms must be relative. And the relative is of all the categories in
the least degree a definite entity or substance; it is posterior to
quality and quantity. The relative is an affection of quantity, as we
have said, and not its matter; since there is something else distinct
which is the matter both of the relative in general and of its parts
and kinds.There is
nothing great or small, many or few, or in general relative, which is
many or few, great or small, or relative to something else without
having a distinct nature of its own. That the relative is in the
lowest degree a substance and a real thing is shown by the fact that
of it alone2 there is
neither generation nor destruction nor change in the sense that in
respect of quantity there is increase and decrease, in respect of
quality, alteration, in respect of place, locomotion, and in respect
of substance, absolute generation and destruction.There is no real change in respect of
the relative; for without any change in itself, one term will be now
greater, now smaller or equal, as the other term undergoes
quantitative change.
1 Cf. sect. 5.
2 Cf. Aristot. Met. 11.12.1. There Aristotle refers to seven categories, but here he omits "activity" and "passivity" as being virtually identical with motion.
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