[1034b]
[1]
and that from which the seed comes has
in some sense the same name as the product (for we must not expect
that all should have the same name in the sense that "man" is produced
by "man"—since woman is also produced by man); unless the
product is a freak. This is why a mule is not produced by a
mule.Those natural objects which are produced, like
artificial objects, spontaneously, are those whose matter can also
initiate for itself that motion which the seed initiates. Those whose
matter cannot do this cannot be generated otherwise than by their
proper parents.It is not only with
reference to substance that our argument shows that the form is not
generated; the same argument is common in its application to all the
primary divisions, i.e. quantity, quality and the other
categories.For just
as the bronze sphere is generated, but not the sphere nor the bronze;
and as in the case of bronze, if it is generated the form and matter
are not (because they must always pre-exist), so it is too with the
"what" and the quality and quantity and the other categories
similarly; for it is not the quality that is generated, but the wood
of that quality; nor is it the size, but the wood or animal of that
size.But a
peculiarity of substance may be gathered from this: that some other
substance must pre-exist in actuality which produces it; e.g. an
animal, if an animal is being generated; but a quality or quantity
need not pre-exist otherwise than potentially.
[20]
Since a
definition is a formula, and every formula has parts; and since the
formula is related to the thing in the same way as the part of the
formula to the part of the thing, the question1 now
arises: Must the formula of the parts be contained in the formula of
the whole, or not? It seems clear that it is so in some cases, but not
in others.The formula of
the circle does not include that of the segments, but the formula of
the syllable includes that of the letters. And yet the circle is
divisible into its segments in just the same way as the syllable into
its letters.Again, if the parts are
prior to the whole, and the acute angle is part of the right angle,
and the finger part of the animal, the acute angle will be prior to
the right angle, and the finger to the man.But it is considered that the latter are
prior; for in the formula the parts are explained from them; and the
wholes are prior also in virtue of their ability to exist
independently. The truth probably is that "part" has several meanings,
one of which is "that which measures in respect of quantity." However,
let us dismiss this question and consider of what, in the sense of
parts, substance consists.
1 The questions discussed in chs. 10-12 arise out of the consideration of essence as definition.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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