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[1052a]
[1]
Truth means to think these objects, and
there is no falsity or deception, but only ignorance—not,
however, ignorance such as blindness is; for blindness is like a total
absence of the power of thinking. And it is obvious that with regard
to immovable things also, if one assumes that there are immovable
things, there is no deception in respect of time.E.g., if we suppose that the triangle
is immutable, we shall not suppose that it sometimes contains two
right angles and sometimes does not, for this would imply that it
changes; but we may suppose that one thing has a certain property and
another has not; e.g., that no even number is a prime, or that some
are primes and others are not. But about a single number we cannot be
mistaken even in this way, for we can no longer suppose that one
instance is of such a nature, and another not, but whether we are
right or wrong, the fact is always the same.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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