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[1008b] [1] But perhaps it will be said that this is the point at issue.

Again, is the man wrong who supposes that a thing is so or not so, and he who supposes both right? If he is right, what is the meaning of saying that "such is the nature of reality"?1 And if he is not right, but is more right than the holder of the first view, reality will at once have a definite nature, and this will be true, and not at the same time not-true.And if all men are equally right and wrong, an exponent of this view can neither speak nor mean anything, since at the same time he says both "yes" and "no." And if he forms no judgement, but "thinks" and "thinks not" indifferently, what difference will there be between him and the vegetables?

Hence it is quite evident that no one, either of those who profess this theory or of any other school, is really in this position.Otherwise, why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home, when he thinks he ought to make the journey? Why does he not walk early one morning into a well or ravine, if he comes to it, instead of clearly guarding against doing so, thus showing that he does not think that it is equally good and not good to fall in? Obviously then he judges that the one course is better and the other worse.And if this is so, he must judge that one thing is man and another not man, [20] and that one thing is sweet and another not sweet. For when, thinking that it is desirable to drink water and see a man, he goes to look for them, he does not look for and judge all things indifferently; and yet he should, if the same thing were equally man and not-man.But as we have said, there is no one who does not evidently avoid some things and not others. Hence, as it seems, all men form unqualified judgements, if not about all things, at least about what is better or worse.And if they do this by guesswork and without knowledge, they should be all the more eager for truth; just as a sick man should be more eager for health than a healthy man; for indeed the man who guesses, as contrasted with him who knows, is not in a healthy relation to the truth.

Again, however much things may be "so and not so," yet differences of degree are inherent in the nature of things. For we should not say that 2 and 3 are equally even; nor are he who thinks that 4 is 5, and he who thinks it is 1000, equally wrong: hence if they are not equally wrong, the one is clearly less wrong, and so more right.If then that which has more the nature of something is nearer to that something,

1 If everything is both so and not so, nothing has any definite nature.

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