[1055b]
[1]
and of these the primary type is
contradiction, and an intermediate is impossible in contradiction but
possible between contraries, obviously contradiction is not the same
as contrariety; and privation is a form of contradiction;for it is either that which is
totally incapable of possessing some attribute,1 or that which would naturally possess some
attribute but does not, that suffers privation—either
absolutely or in some specified way. Here we already have several
meanings, which we have distinguished elsewhere. Thus privation is a
kind of contradiction or incapacity which is determinate or associated
with the receptive material.This is why though there is no intermediate in
contradiction there is one in some kinds of privation. For everything
is either equal or not equal, but not everything is either equal or
unequal; if it is, it is only so in the case of a material which
admits of equality. If, then, processes of material generation start
from the contraries, and proceed either from the form and the
possession of the form, or from some privation of the form or shape,
clearly all contrariety must be a form of privation, although
presumably not all privation is contrariety.This is because that which suffers privation
may suffer it in several senses; for it is only the extremes from
which changes proceed that are contraries.This can also be shown by induction. Every
contrariety involves privation as one of its contraries, but not
always in the same way:
[20]
inequality involves the privation of equality, dissimilarity that of
similarity, evil that of goodness.And the differences are as we have stated: one
case is, if a thing is merely deprived; another, if it is deprived at
a certain time or in a certain part—e.g. at a certain age or
in the important part—or entirely. Hence in some cases there
is an intermediate (there are men who are neither good nor bad), and
in others there is not—a thing must be either odd or
even.Again, some
have a determinate subject, and others have not. Thus it is evident
that one of a pair of contraries always has a privative sense; but it
is enough if this is true of the primary or generic contraries, e.g.
unity and plurality; for the others can be reduced to them.
Since one thing has one contrary, it might be asked in what sense
unity is opposed to plurality, and the equal to the great and to the
small. For if we always use the word "whether" in an
antithesis—e.g., "whether it is white or black," or "whether
it is white or not" (but we do not ask "whether it is a man or white,"
unless we are proceeding upon some assumption, and asking, for
instance, whether it was Cleon who came or
Socrates.This is not a necessary disjunction in any
class of things, but is derived from the use in the case of
opposites—for it is only opposites that cannot be true at
the same time—and we have this same use here in the question
"which of the two came?"
1 This is not a proper example of privation. Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.22.
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