[999a]
[1]
Moreover, if Unity is really more of the
nature of a principle, and the indivisible is a unity, and every thing
indivisible is such either in quantity or in kind, and the indivisible
in kind is prior to the divisible, and the genera are divisible into
species, then it is rather the lowest predicate that will be a unity
(for "man" is not the genus1 of individual men).Further, in the case of things which
admit of priority and posteriority, that which is predicated of the
things cannot exist apart from them. E.g., if 2 is the first number,
there will be no Number apart from the species of number; and
similarly there will be no Figure apart from the species of figures.
But if the genera do not exist apart from the species in these cases,
they will scarcely do so in others; because it is assumed that genera
are most likely to exist in these cases.In individuals, however, there is no priority
and posteriority. Further, where there is a question of better or
worse, the better is always prior; so there will be no genus in these
cases either.From these considerations
it seems that it is the terms predicated of individuals, rather than
the genera, that are the first principles. But again on the other hand
it is not easy to say in what sense we are to understand these to be
principles;for the
first principle and cause must be apart from the things of which it is
a principle, and must be able to exist when separated from them. But
why should we assume that such a thing exists
[20]
alongside of the individual, except in
that it is predicated universally and of all the terms? And indeed if
this is a sufficient reason, it is the more universal concepts that
should rather be considered to be principles; and so the primary
genera will be the principles.2In this
connection there is a difficulty which is the hardest and yet the most
necessary of all to investigate, and with which our inquiry is now
concerned. (7.) If nothing exists apart from individual things, and
these are infinite in number, how is it possible to obtain knowledge
of the numerically infinite? For we acquire our knowledge of all
things only in so far as they contain something universal, some one
and identical characteristic.But if this is essential, and there must be
something apart from individual things, it must be the genera; either
the lowest or the highest; but we have just concluded that this is
impossible.3Further,
assuming that when something is predicated of matter there is in the
fullest sense something apart from the concrete whole, if there is
something, must it exist apart from all concrete wholes,
or apart from some but not others, or apart from none?
1 sc. but the species.
2 For partial solutions to the problem see Aristot. Met. 7.10, 12-13.
3 In Aristot. Met. 3.3.
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