[
1029b]
[1]
It is convenient to advance to the more
intelligible
1; for learning is always acquired
in this way, by advancing through what is less intelligible by nature
to what is more so. And just as in actions it is our task to start
from the good of the individual and make absolute good good for the
individual,
2 so it is our
task to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make what
is by nature intelligible intelligible to oneself.Now that which is intelligible and
primary to individuals is often but slightly intelligible, and
contains but little reality; but nevertheless, starting from that
which is imperfectly intelligible but intelligible to oneself, we must
try to understand the absolutely intelligible; advancing, as we have
said, by means of these very things which are intelligible to
us.
Since we distinguished at the
beginning
3 the number of ways in
which substance is defined, and since one of these appeared to be
essence, we must investigate this.First, let us make certain linguistic
statements about it.
The essence of each
thing is that which it is said to be per se. "To be you" is not "to be
cultured," because you are not of your own nature cultured. Your
essence, then, is that which you are said to be
of your own nature. But not even all of this is the
essence; for the essence is not that which is said to be per se in the
sense that whiteness is said to belong to a surface,
4 because "being a surface" is not
"being white."Nor is the
essence the combination of both, "being a white surface." Why? Because
the word itself is repeated.
[20]
Hence the formula of the essence of each thing is that which defines
the term but does not contain it. Thus if "being a white surface" is
the same as "being a smooth surface," "white" and "smooth" are one and
the same.
5But since in the other
categories too there are compounds with substance (because there is a
substrate for each category, e.g. quality, quantity, time, place and
motion), we must inquire whether there is a formula of the essence of
each one of them; whether these compounds, e.g. "white man," also have
an essence. Let the compound be denoted by X.
6
What is the essence of X?
"But this is
not even a per se expression." We reply that there are two ways in
which a definition can be not per se true of its subject: (a) by an
addition, and (b) by an omission.In one case the definition is not per se true
because the term which is being defined is combined with something
else; as if, e.g., in defining whiteness one were to state the
definition of a white man. In the other, because something else (which
is not in the definition) is combined with the subject; as if, e.g., X
were to denote "white man," and X were defined as "white." "White man"
is white,