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[1063a] [1] for the same thing never seems to some people sweet and to others to the contrary unless one of the parties has the organ of sense which distinguishes the said flavors injured or impaired. Such being the case, the one party should be taken as the "measure," and the other not.And I hold the same in the case of good and bad, and of beautiful and ugly, and of all other such qualities. For to maintain this view1 is just the same as to maintain that what appears to us when we press the finger below the eye and make a thing seem two instead of one must be two because it appears to be so, and then afterwards that it must be one; because if we do not interfere with our sight that which is one appears to be one.And in general it is absurd to form our opinion of the truth from the appearances of things in this world of ours which are subject to change and never remain in the same state2; for it is by reference to those things which are always the same state and undergo no change that we should prosecute our search for truth.Of this kind are the heavenly bodies; for these do not appear to be now of one nature and subsequently of another, but are manifestly always the same and have no change of any kind.

Again, if there is motion there is also something which is moved; and everything is moved from something and into something. Therefore that which is moved must be in that from which it is to be moved, [20] and must also not be in it; and must be moved into so-and-so and must also come to be in it; but the contradictory statements cannot be true at the same time, as our opponents allege.And if the things of our world are in a state of continuous flux and motion in respect of quantity, and we assume this although it is not true, why should they not be constant in respect of quality?3 It appears that not the least reason why our opponents predicate opposite statements of the same thing is that they start with the assumption that quantity is not constant in the case of bodies; hence they say that the same thing is and is not six feet long.But essence depends upon quality, and this is of a determinate, whereas quantity is of an indeterminate nature.

Again, when the doctor orders them to adopt some article of diet, why do they adopt it?4 For on their view it is no more true that a thing is bread than that it is not; and therefore it would make no difference whether they ate it or not. But as it is, they adopt a particular food as though they knew the truth about it and it were the food prescribed;yet they ought not to do so if there were no fixed and permanent nature in sensible things and everything were always in a state of motion and flux.

Again, if we are always changing and never remain the same, is it any wonder that to us, as to the diseased, things never appear the same?5

1 i.e., that the same thing has contrary qualities.

2 sect. 8, 9 (first half)=Aristot. Met. 4.5.21, 22.

3 Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.5.20, 21.

4 Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.4.39-42.

5 With this section cf. Aristot. Met. 4.5.7-14.

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