[1039a]
[1]
but "such and-such." Otherwise amongst many other
awkward consequences we have the "third man."1Again, it is clear in this way
too. Substance can not consist of substances actually present in it;
for that which is actually two can never be actually one, whereas if
it is potentially two it can be one. E.g., the double consists of two
halves—that is, potentially; for the actualization separates
the halves.Thus if
substance is one, it cannot consist of substances present in it even
in this sense, as Democritus rightly observes; he says that it is
impossible for two to come from one, or one from two, because he
identifies substance with the atoms.2Clearly then the same will also hold good in the case of number
(assuming that number is a composition of units, as it is said to be
by some); because either 2 is not 1, or there is not
actually a unit in it.The consequence
involves a difficulty; for if no substance can consist of universals,
because they mean "of such a kind," and not a particular thing; and if
no substance can be actually composed of substances, every substance
will be incomposite, and so there will be no formula of any
substance.But in
point of fact it is universally held, and has been previously
stated,3
[20]
that substance is the only or chief
subject of definition; but on this showing there is no definition even
of substance. Then there can be no definition of anything; or rather
in a sense there can, and in a sense cannot. What this means will be
clearer from what follows later.4From these same considerations
it is clear also what consequence follows for those who maintain that
the Forms are substances and separable, and who at the same time make
the species consist of the genus and the differentiae. If there are
Forms, and if "animal" is present in the man and the horse, it is
either numerically one and the same with them, or not.(In formula they are clearly
one; for in each case the speaker will enunciate the same formula.)
If, then, there is in some sense an Absolute Man, who is an individual
and exists separately, then the constituents, e.g. "animal" and
"two-footed," must have an individual meaning and be separable and
substances. Hence there must be an Absolute Animal too.(i) Then if the "animal" which is in the horse and the man is one
and the same, as you are one and the same with yourself,
1 See note on Aristot. Met. 1.9.3.
2 Cf. Aristot. De Caelo 303a 6, Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. 325a 35.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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