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[1048b]
[1]
so is that which is
awake to that which is asleep; and that which is seeing to that which
has the eyes shut, but has the power of sight; and that which is
differentiated out of matter to the matter; and the finished article
to the raw material.Let
actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the
potential by the other.But things are
not all said to exist actually in the same sense, but only by
analogy—as A is in B or to B, so is C in or to D; for the
relation is either that of motion to potentiality, or that of
substance to some particular matter.Infinity and void
and other concepts of this kind are said to "be" potentially or
actually in a different sense from the majority of existing things,
e.g. that which sees, or walks, or is seen.For in these latter cases the predication may
sometimes be truly made without qualification, since "that which is
seen" is so called sometimes because it is seen and sometimes because
it is capable of being seen; but the Infinite does not exist
potentially in the sense that it will ever exist separately in
actuality; it is separable only in knowledge. For the fact that the
process of division never ceases makes this actuality exist
potentially, but not separately.1Since no action which has a
limit is an end, but only a means to the end, as, e.g., the process of
thinning;
[20]
and since
the parts of the body themselves, when one is thinning them, are in
motion in the sense that they are not already that which it is the
object of the motion to make them, this process is not an action, or
at least not a complete one, since it is not an end; it is the process
which includes the end that is an action.E.g., at the same time we see and have seen,
understand and have understood, think and have thought; but we cannot
at the same time learn and have learnt, or become healthy and be
healthy. We are living well and have lived well, we are happy and have
been happy, at the same time; otherwise the process would have had to
cease at some time, like the thinning-process; but it has not ceased
at the present moment; we both are living and have lived.Now of these processes we should call the
one type motions, and the other actualizations.Every motion is
incomplete—the processes of thinning, learning, walking,
building—these are motions, and incomplete at that. For it
is not the same thing which at the same time is walking and has
walked, or is building and has built, or is becoming and has become,
or is being moved and has been moved, but two different things; and
that which is causing motion is different from that which has caused
motion.But the same
thing at the same time is seeing and has seen, is thinking and has
thought. The latter kind of process, then, is what I mean by
actualization, and the former what I mean by motion.What the actual is, then, and what it is like, may
be regarded as demonstrated from these and similar
considerations.We must, however, distinguish when a
particular thing exists potentially, and when it does not; for it does
not so exist at any and every time.
1 For Aristotle's views about infinity and void see Aristot. Physics 3.4-8, 4.6-9 respectively.
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