[1064a]
[1]
e.g., the sciences of medicine and
physical culture do this, and so does each of the other productive and
mathematical sciences. Each one of these marks out for itself some
class of objects, and concerns itself with this as with something
existent and real, but not qua real; it is
another science distinct from these which does this.Each of the said sciences arrives in
some way at the essence in a particular class of things, and then
tries to prove the rest more or less exactly. Some arrive at the
essence through sense-perception, and some by hypothesis; hence it is
obvious from such a process of induction that there is no
demonstration of the reality or essence. Now since there
is a science of nature, clearly it must be different from both
practical and productive science. In a productive science the source
of motion is in the producer and not in the thing produced, and is
either an art or some other kind of potency; and similarly in a
practical science the motion is not in the thing acted upon but rather
in the agent.But the
science of the natural philosopher is concerned with things which
contain in themselves a source of motion. From this it is clear that
natural science must be neither practical nor productive, but
speculative; since it must fall under one of these classes.And since every science must
have some knowledge of the essence
[20]
and must use it as a starting-point, we must be
careful to observe how the natural philosopher should define, and how
he should regard the formula of essence—whether in the same
way as the term "snub," or rather as the term "concave."For of these the formula of
"snub" is stated in conjunction with the matter of the object, whereas
that of "concave" is stated apart from the matter; since snubness is
only found in the nose, which is therefore included in the formula,
for "the snub" is a concave nose . Thus it is obvious
that the formula of "flesh" and "eye" and the other parts of the body
must always be stated in conjunction with their matter.
Since there is a science of Being qua Being and
separately existent, we must inquire whether this should be regarded
as identical with natural science or rather as a distinct branch of
knowledge. Physics deals with things which contain a source of motion
in themselves, and mathematics is speculative and is a science which
deals with permanent things, but not with things which can exist
separately.Hence
there is a science distinct from both of these, which deals with that
which exists separately and is immovable; that is, if there really is
a substance of this kind—I mean separately existent and
immovable—as we shall endeavor to prove.1 And if there is an entity of this kind in
the world of reality, here surely must be the Divine, and this must be
the first and most fundamental principle.
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