[1058b]
[1]
and since one
element is formula and the other matter, contrarieties in the formula
produce difference in species, but contrarieties in the concrete whole
do not.Hence the whiteness
or blackness of a man does not produce this, nor is there any specific
difference between a white man and a black man; not even if one term
is assigned to each. For we are now regarding "man" as matter, and
matter does not produce difference; and for this reason, too,
individual men are not species of "man," although the flesh and bones
of which this and that man consist are different. The concrete whole
is "other," but not "other in species," because there is no
contrariety in the formula, and this is the ultimate indivisible
species.But Callias
is definition and matter. Then so too is "white man,"
because it is the individual, Callias, who is white. Hence "man" is
only white accidentally. Again, a bronze circle and a wooden one do
not differ in species; and a bronze triangle and a wooden circle
differ in species not because of their matter, but because there is
contrariety in their formulae. But does not
matter, when it is "other" in a particular way, make things "other in
species"? Probably there is a sense in which it does. Otherwise why is
this particular horse "other in species" than this particular man,
although the definitions involve matter? Surely it is because there is
contrariety in the definition, for so there also is in "white man" and
"black horse";
[20]
and it is a
contrariety in species, but not because one is white and the other
black; for even if they had both been white, they would still be
"other in species." "Male" and "female" are attributes
peculiar to the animal, but not in virtue of its substance; they ar
material or physical. Hence the same semen may, as the result of some
modification, become either female or male.We have now stated what "to be other in species"
means, and why some things differ in species and others do
not. Since contraries are other in form,1 and "the perishable" and "imperishable" are contraries (for privation is a
definite incapacity), "the perishable" must be "other in kind" than
"the imperishable." But so far we have spoken only of the universal
terms; and so it might appear to be unnecessary that
anything perishable and imperishable should be "other in
form," just as in the case of white and black.For the same thing may be both at the
same time, if it is a universal (e.g, "man" may be both white and
black); and it may still be both if it is a particular, for the same
person may be white and black, although not at the same time. Yet
white is contrary to black. But although some contraries(e.g. those which we have just
mentioned, and many others) can belong to certain things accidentally,
others cannot;
1 It appears that in this chapter (apart from 5, which may be a later addition) the terms εἶδος and γένος are used in a non-technical sense. Cf. Ross on Aristot. Met. 1058b 28.
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