[1054b]
[1]
and
again (c) if the formula of the primary substance is one, e.g., equal
straight lines are the same, and equal quadrilaterals with equal
angles, and there are many more examples; but in these equality means
unity. Things are "similar"1(a) if, while not being the same absolutely
or indistinguishable in respect of their concrete substance, they are
identical in form; e.g the larger square is similar to the smaller,
and unequal straight lines are similar. These are similar, but not
absolutely the same. (b) If, having the same form, and being capable
of difference in degree, they have no difference of degree.(c) If things have an attribute
which is the same and one in form—e.g. white—in
different degrees, we say that they are similar because their form is
one. (d) If the respects in which they are the same are more than
those in which they differ, either in general or as regards their more
prominent qualities; e.g., tin is similar to silver, as being white;
and gold to fire, as being yellow or flame-colored. Thus
it is obvious that "Other"2 and
"Unlike" also have several meanings. (a) In one sense "other" is used
in the sense opposite to "the same"; thus everything in relation to
every other thing is either "the same" or "other." (b) In another
sense things are "other" unless both their matter and their formula
are one; thus you are "other" than your neighbor. (c) The third sense
is that which is found in mathematics.3 Therefore everything in relation to everything else is
called either "other" or "the same"; that is, in the case of things of
which unity and being are predicated;
[20]
for
"other" is not the contradictory of "the same," and so it is not
predicated of non-existent things (they are called "not the same"),
but it is predicated of all things which exist; for whatever is by
nature existent and one is either one or not one with something
else."Other" and "same," then,
are opposed in this way; but "difference"4 is distinct from "otherness."For that which is "other" than
something need not be other in a particular respect, since everything
which is existent is either "other" or "the same." But that which is
different from something is different in some particular respect, so
that that in which they differ must be the same sort of thing; i.e.
the same genus or species.For everything which is different differs either in genus or in
species—in genus, such things as have not common matter and
cannot be generated into or out of each other, e.g. things which
belong to different categories; and in species, such things as are of
the same genus (genus meaning that which is predicated of both the
different things alike in respect of their substance). The contraries5
are different, and contrariety is a kind of difference. That this is
rightly premissed is made clear by induction; for the contraries are
obviously all different, since they are not merely "other," but some
are other in genus, and others are in the same line of predication,
1 Or "like." Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.9.5.
2 Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.9.4.
3 sc. as opposed to "same" in sense (a); 3 above.
4 Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.9.4.
5 Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.10.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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