[
997b]
[1]
(as they hold who
speak of the Forms and the Intermediates, which they maintain to be
the objects of the mathematical sciences)?In what sense we Platonists hold the Forms to
be both causes and independent substances has been stated
1 in our original discussion on this subject.
But while they involve difficulty in many respects, not the least
absurdity is the doctrine that there are certain entities apart from
those in the sensible universe, and that these are the same as
sensible things except in that the former are eternal and the latter
perishable.
2For Platonists say nothing more or less than that there is an
absolute Man, and Horse, and Health; in which they closely resemble
those who state that there are Gods, but of human form; for as the
latter invented nothing more or less than eternal men, so the former
simply make the Forms eternal sensibles.
Again, if anyone posits Intermediates distinct from Forms and
sensible things, he will have many difficulties;because obviously not only will there
be lines apart from both Ideal and sensible lines, but it will be the
same with each of the other classes.
3
Thus since astronomy is one of the mathematical sciences, there will
have to be a heaven besides the sensible heaven, and a sun and moon,
and all the other heavenly bodies.But how are we to believe this? Nor is it
reasonable that the heaven should be immovable; but that it should
move
[20]
is utterly
impossible.
4 It is the same
with the objects of optics and the mathematical theory of harmony;
these too, for the same reasons, cannot exist apart from sensible
objects. Because if there are intermediate objects of sense and
sensations, clearly there will also be animals intermediate between
the Ideal animals and the perishable animals.
5One might also
raise the question with respect to what kind of objects we are to look
for these sciences. For if we are to take it that the only difference
between mensuration and geometry is that the one is concerned with
things which we can perceive and the other with things which we
cannot, clearly there will be a science parallel to medicine (and to
each of the other sciences), intermediate between Ideal medicine and
the medicine which we know.Yet how is this possible? for then there would be a class of healthy
things apart from those which are sensible and from the Ideally
healthy. Nor, at the same time, is it true that mensuration is
concerned with sensible and perishable magnitudes; for then it would
perish as they do. Nor, again, can astronomy be concerned with
sensible magnitudes or with this heaven of ours;