[1004b]
[1]
If this is not
so, who is it who in will investigate whether "
Socrates" and "
Socrates seated" are the same
thing; or whether one thing has one contrary, or what the contrary is,
or how many meanings it has?1 and similarly with all other such
questions.Thus
since these are the essential modifications of Unity qua Unity and of Being qua Being,
and not qua numbers or lines or fire, clearly
it a pertains to that science2 to discover both the
essence and the attributes of these concepts.And those who investigate them err, not
in being unphilosophical, but because the substance, of which they
have no real knowledge, is prior. For just as number qua number has its peculiar modifications, e.g. oddness
and evenness, commensurability and equality, excess and defect, and
these things are inherent in numbers both considered independently and
in relation to other numbers; and as similarly other peculiar
modifications are inherent in the solid and the immovable and the
moving and the weightless and that which has weight; so Being qua Being has certain peculiar modifications,
and it is about these that it is the philosopher's function to
discover the truth. And here is evidence of this fact.Dialecticians and sophists
wear the same appearance as the philosopher, for sophistry is Wisdom
in appearance only, and dialecticians discuss all subjects,
[20]
and Being is a subject common to
them all; but clearly they discuss these concepts because they
appertain to philosophy.For sophistry and dialectic are concerned with the same class of
subjects as philosophy, but philosophy differs from the former in the
nature of its capability and from the latter in its outlook on life.
Dialectic treats as an exercise what philosophy tries to understand,
and sophistry seems to be philosophy; but is not.Further, the second column of contraries is privative, and
everything is reducible to Being and Not being, and Unity and
Plurality; e.g. Rest falls under Unity and Motion under Plurality. And
nearly everyone agrees that substance and existing things are composed
of contraries; at any rate all speak of the first principles as
contraries—some as Odd and Even,3 some as Hot and Cold,4 some
as Limit and Unlimited,5 some as Love and Strife.6 And it is
apparent that all other things also are reducible to Unity and
Plurality (we may assume this reduction);
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