[
998a]
[1]
for as sensible
lines are not like those of which the geometrician speaks (since there
is nothing sensible which is straight or curved in that sense; the
circle
1
touches the ruler not at a point, but <along a line> as
Protagoras used to say in refuting the geometricians), so the paths
and orbits of our heaven are not like those which astronomy discusses,
nor have the symbols of the astronomer the same nature as the
stars.
Some, however, say that these so-called
Intermediates between Forms and sensibles do exist: not indeed
separately from the sensibles, but in them. It would take too long to
consider in detail all the impossible consequences of this theory, but
it will be sufficient to observe the following.On this view it is not logical that
only this should be so; in clearly it would be possible for the Forms
also to be in sensible things; for the same argument applies to both.
Further, it follows necessarily that two solids must occupy the same
space; and that the Forms cannot be immovable, being present in
sensible things, which move.And in general, what is the object of assuming
that Intermediates exist, but only in sensible things? The same
absurdities as before will result: there will be a heaven besides the
sensible one, only not apart from it, but in the same place; which is
still more impossible.
2
[20]
Thus it is very
difficult to say, not only what view we should adopt in the foregoing
questions in order to arrive at the truth, but also in the case of the
first principles (vi.) whether we should assume that the genera, or
the simplest constituents of each particular thing, are more truly the
elements and first principles of existing things. E.g., it is
generally agreed that the elements and first principles of speech are
those things of which, in their simplest form, all speech is composed;
and not the common term "speech"; and in the case of geometrical
propositions we call those the "elements"
3 whose proofs are embodied in the proofs of all or
most of the rest.Again, in
the case of bodies, both those who hold that there are several
elements and those who hold that there is one call the things of which
bodies are composed and constituted first principles. E.g., Empedocles
states that fire and water and the other things associated with them
are the elements which are present in things and of which things are
composed; he does not speak of them as genera of things.Moreover in the case of other
things too, if a man wishes to examine their nature