[1006b]
[1]
for one could assign a different
name to each formula.For
instance, it might be said that "man" has not one meaning but several,
one of which has the formula "two-footed animal," and there might be
many other formulae as well, if they were limited in number; for a
particular name could be assigned to each for formula.If on the other hand it be
said that "man" has an infinite number of meanings, obviously there
can be no discourse; for not to have one meaning is to have no
meaning, and if words have no meaning there is an end of discourse
with others, and even, strictly speaking, with oneself; because it is
impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing; and
even if this were possible, one name might be assigned to that of
which we think.Now let
this name, as we said at the beginning, have a meaning; and let it
have one meaning. Now it is impossible that "being man" should have
the same meaning as "not being man," that is, if "man" is not merely
predicable of one subject but has one meaning(for we do not identify "having one
meaning" with "being predicable of one subject," since in this case
"cultured" and "white" and "man" would have one meaning, and so all
things would be one; for they would all have the same meaning). And it
will be impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, except by
equivocation, as e.g. one whom we call "man"
[20]
others might call "not-man";but the problem is whether the
same thing can at once be and not be "man," not in name ,
but in fact . If "man" and "not-man" have not different
meanings, clearly "not being a man" will mean nothing different from
"being a man"; and so "being a man" will be "not being a man"; they
will be one.For "to be
one" means, as in the case of "garment" and "coat," that the formula
is one. And if "being man" and "being not-man" are to be one, they
will have the same meaning; but it has been proved above that they
have different meanings. If then anything can be truly said to be
"man," it must be "two-footed animal"; for this is what "man" was
intended to mean.And if
this is necessarily so, it is impossible that at the same time the
same thing should not be "two-footed animal." For "to be necessarily
so" means this: that it is impossible not to be so. Thus it cannot be
true to say at the same time that the same thing is and is not
man.And the same
argument holds also in the case of not being man;
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