[997a]
[1]
comprehension of these principles is no more
peculiar to the science which investigates substances than to any
other science.Besides, in
what sense can there in be a science of these principles? We know
already just what each of them is; at any rate other sciences employ
them as being known to us.1 If,
however there is a demonstrative science of them, there will have to
be some underlying genus, and some of the principles will be derived
from axioms, and others will be unproved(for there cannot be demonstration of
everything), since demonstration must proceed from something, and have
some subject matter, and prove something. Thus it follows that there
is some one genus of demonstrable things; for all the demonstrative
sciences employ axioms.On the other
hand, if the science of substance is distinct from the science of
these principles, which is of its own nature the more authoritative
and ultimate?The axioms
are most universal, and are the first principles of everything. And
whose province will it be, if not the philosopher's, to study truth
and error with respect to them?2(3.) And
in general, is there one science of all substances, or more than
one?3 if there is not one,
with what sort of substance must we assume that this science is
concerned?On the
other hand, it is not probable that there is one science of all
substances; for then there would be one demonstrative of all
attributes—assuming that every demonstrative
science
[20]
proceeds from
accepted beliefs and studies the essential attributes concerned with
some definite subject matter.Thus to study the essential attributes
connected with the same genus is the province of the same science
proceeding from the same beliefs. For the subject matter belongs to
one science, and so do the axioms, whether to the same science or to a
different one; hence so do the attributes, whether they are studied by
these sciences themselves or by one derived from them.4(v.) Further, is this study
concerned only with substances, or with their attributes as well?5 I mean, e.g., if the solid is a
kind of substance, and so too lines and planes, is it the province of
the same science to investigate both these and their attributes, in
every class of objects about which mathematics demonstrates anything,
or of a different science?If of the same, then the science of substance too would be in some
sense demonstrative; but it does not seem that there is any
demonstration of the "what is it?" And if of a different science, what
will be the science which studies the attributes of substance? This is
a very difficult question to answer.6(iv.) Further, are we to say that only sensible substances exist, or
that others do as well? and is there really only one kind of
substance, or more than one
1 sc. and so there can be no science which defines them.
2 For the answer see Aristot. Met. 4.3.
3 Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.6.
4 For the answer see Aristot. Met. 4.2.9-10, Aristot. Met. 6.1.
5 Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.8-10.
6 This problem, together with the appendix to it stated in Aristot. Met. 3.1.9-10, is answered in Aristot. Met. 4.2.8-25.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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