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[994a]
[1]
Moreover, it is obvious that there is some first principle, and that
the causes of things are not infinitely many either in a direct
sequence or in kind. For the material generation of one thing from
another cannot go on in an infinite progression (e.g. flesh from
earth, earth from air, air from fire, and so on without a stop); nor
can the source of motion (e.g. man be moved by air, air by the sun,
the sun by Strife,1 with no limit
to the series).In the same
way neither can the Final Cause recede to infinity—walking
having health for its object, and health happiness, and happiness
something else: one thing always being done for the sake of
another.And it is
just the same with the Formal Cause. For in the case of all
intermediate terms of a series which are contained between a first and
last term, the prior term is necessarily the cause of those which
follow it; because if we had to say which of the three is the cause,
we should say "the first." At any rate it is not the last term,
because what comes at the end is not the cause of anything. Neither,
again, is the intermediate term, which is only the cause of
one(and it makes no
difference whether there is one intermediate term or several, nor
whether they are infinite or limited in number). But of series which
are infinite in this way, and in general of the infinite, all the
parts are equally intermediate, down to the present moment. Thus if
there is no first term, there is no cause at all.On the
other hand there can be no infinite progression downwards
[20]
(where there is a beginning in
the upper direction) such that from fire comes water, and from water
earth, and in this way some other kind of thing is always being
produced. There are two senses in which one thing "comes from"
another—apart from that in which one thing is said to come
after another, e.g. the Olympian "from"2 the Isthmian
games—either as a man comes from a child as it develops, or
as air comes from water.Now we say that a man "comes from" a child in the sense that that
which has become something comes from that which
is becoming: i.e. the perfect from the imperfect. (For
just as "becoming" is always intermediate between being and not-being,
so is that which is becoming between what is and what is not. The
learner is becoming informed, and that is the meaning of the statement
that the informed person "comes from" the learner.)On the other hand A comes from B in the
sense that water comes from air by the destruction of B. Hence the
former class of process is not reversible
1 Aristotle is evidently thinking of Empedocles' system.
2 ἐκ means not only "from" but "after"; Aristotle dismisses this latter meaning. The Isthmian fell alternatively in the same year as the Olympian festival; when this happened the former was held in the spring and the latter in the summer. Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.24.5.
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