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[18]
Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, is double. One
division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other,
the seat of the appetites and of desire in general, does in a sense participate in
principle, as being amenable and obedient to it （in the sense in fact in which we
speak of ‘paying heed’ to one's father and friends, not in the sense
of the term ‘rational’ in mathematics1）. And that principle
can in a manner appeal to the irrational part, is indicated by our practice of admonishing
delinquents, and by our employment of rebuke and exhortation generally.
1 This parenthetical note on the phrase ‘to have logos’ is untranslatable, and confusing even in the Greek. According to the psychology here expounded, the intellect ‘has a plan or principle,’ in the sense of understanding principle, and being able to reason and make a plan: in other words, it is fully rational. The appetitive part of man's nature ‘has a plan or principle’ in so far as it is capable of following or obeying a principle. It happens that this relationship of following or obeying can itself be expressed by the words ‘to have logos’ in another sense of that phrase, viz. ‘to take account of, pay heed to.’ To be precise the writer should say that the appetitive part λόγον ἔχει τοῦ λόγου ‘has logos （takes account） of the logos.’ The phrase has yet a third sense in mathematics, where “to have logos” （ratio） means ‘to be rational’ in the sense of commensurable.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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