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Now the cause of action (the efficient, not the final cause) is choice,1 and the cause of choice is desire and reasoning directed to some end. Hence choice necessarily involves both intellect or thought and a certain disposition of character [2 for doing well and the reverse in the sphere of action necessarily involve thought and character].

1 Cf. 3.2.1 note. Here again προαίρεσις seems to mean choice of means, not of ends.

2 This clause must be rejected as superfluous and logically unsound: the nature of action is explained by that of ‘choice,’ not vice versa.

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