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[2]
Again they argue1 that
good is definite, but that pleasure is indefinite, because it admits of degrees. Now
（a） if they base this judgement on the fact that one can be more or less
pleased, the same argument will apply to Justice and the other virtues, the possessors of
which are clearly spoken of as being more or less
virtuous; for example, A may be more just or brave, and may act more, or less, justly or
temperately, than B. If on the other hand （b） they judge by the nature
of the pleasures themselves, I am afraid they do not state the right ground for their
conclusion, if it be true that there are two kinds of pleasures, unmixed as well as
mixed.2
1 Plat. Phileb. 24e, Plat. Phileb. 31a.
2 i.e., when they attribute ‘indefiniteness’ to pleasure, they are really thinking of the ‘mixed’ pleasures only; it does not apply to the ‘pure’ pleasures, in which there is no admixture of pain; and the distinction between these two kinds of pleasure is Plato's own.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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