Hide browse bar Your current position in the text is marked in blue. Click anywhere in the line to jump to another position:
chapter:
This text is part of:
Search the Perseus Catalog for:
View text chunked by:
- bekker page : bekker line
- book : chapter : section
Table of Contents:
[10]
And further, the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. For the feeling of
pleasure is an experience of the soul,1 and a thing gives a
man pleasure in regard to which he is described as ‘fond of’
so-and-so: for instance a horse gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond
of the theater, and similarly just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice, and acts
conforming with virtue generally to the lover of virtue.
1 Not an experience of the body （cf. 10.3.6）, even the case of ‘bodily pleasures.’ This brings pleasure within the definition of happiness as “an activity of the soul.”
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
The Annenberg CPB/Project provided support for entering this text.
Purchase a copy of this text (not necessarily the same edition) from Amazon.com
show
Browse Bar
hide
Places (automatically extracted)
View a map of the most frequently mentioned places in this document.
Download Pleiades ancient places geospacial dataset for this text.
hide
Search
hideStable Identifiers
hide
Display Preferences