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That pain moreover is
an evil and to be avoided is admitted; since all pain is either absolutely evil, or evil
as being some way an impediment to activity. But that which is the opposite of something
to be avoided—opposed to it as a thing to be avoided and evil—must be
good. It follows therefore that pleasure is a good. Speusippus attempted to refute this
argument1 by saying
that, as the greater is opposed to the equal as well as to the less, so pleasure is
opposed to a neutral state of feeling as well as to pain. But this refutation does not
hold good; for Speusippus would not maintain that pleasure is essentially evil.
1 See more fully, 10.2.5.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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