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1 ἀγχίνοια appears from Aristot. Post. Anal. 1.33, 89b 10, to denote the faculty of guessing immediately the ‘middle term’ or fact which explains the relation observed between two objects.
2 Perhaps the text should be emended to read `inasmuch as one who deliberates badly goes wrong and one who deliberates well acts rightly.’
3 i.e., correct knowledge is a redundant expression; knowledge means correct notions; erroneous notions are not knowledge.
4 The two sentences bracketed interrupt the argument. The rest seems to belong to 9.2, though it does not fit in there exactly. The second is altogether irrelevant, and employs the term διάνοια of the intellect as enquiring, not as contemplating the results of enquiry, a Platonic use not found elsewhere in Aristotle: ‘correctness in thinking’ here is in fact equivalent to ‘correctness in deliberation’ in 9.4.