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[7] Bestiality1 is less <evil> than vice, though more horrible: for <in a bestial man as in an animal> the highest part <i.e. the intellect> is not corrupted, as it is in a man <who is wicked in a human way>, but entirely lacking. So that it is like comparing an inanimate with an animate thing, and asking which is the more evil; for the badness of a thing which has no originating principle—and intelligence is such a principle—is always less capable of mischief.2 (It is therefore like comparing Injustice with an unjust man: one is worse in one way and the other in another). For a bad man can do ten thousand times more harm than an animal <or a bestial man>.

1 No two commentators read the same sense into this section, which is ‘little more than a series of jottings’ ( Burnet). The version given largely follows Peters. The insertions in brackets indicate what may possibly have been in the writer's mind.

2 The relevance of this parenthesis is obscure; its meaning, in the light of other passages in Aristotle, may be that injustice is worse in the sense that it is evil per se (whereas the unjust man is evil per accidens) , but the unjust man is worse in the sense that he is productive of evil.

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