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[8]
When an injury is done knowingly but not deliberately, it
is （3） an act of injustice or wrong; such, for instance, are injuries
done through anger, or any other unavoidable or natural passion to which men are liable;
since in committing these injuries and errors a man acts unjustly, and his action is an
act of injustice, but he is not ipso facto unjust or wicked,
for the injury was not done out of wickedness. When however an injury is done from choice,
the doer is unjust and wicked.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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