A starting-point for our investigation is to ask1
whether the differentia2
self-restrained man and the unrestrained is constituted by their objects, or by their
dispositions: I mean, whether a man is called unrestrained solely because he fails to
restrain himself with reference to certain things, or rather because he has a certain
disposition, or rather for both reasons combined. A second question is, can Self-restraint
and Unrestraint be displayed in regard to everything, or not? When a man is said to be
‘unrestrained’ without further qualification, it does not mean that he
is so in relation to everything, but to those
things in regard to which a man can be profligate; and also it does not mean merely that
he is concerned with these things （for in that case Unrestraint would be the same
thing as Profligacy）, but that he is concerned with them in a particular manner.
The profligate yields to his appetites from choice, considering it right always to pursue
the pleasure that offers, whereas the man of defective self-restraint does not think so,
but pursues it all the same.