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[15] But the term ‘involuntary’ does not really apply to an action when the agent is ignorant of his true interests. The ignorance that makes an act blameworthy is not ignorance displayed in moral choice1 （that sort of ignorance constitutes vice）—that is to say, they result not from general ignorance （because that is held to be blameworthy）, but from particular ignorance, ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the things2 affected by it; for in this case the act is pitied and forgiven, because he who acts in ignorance of any of these circumstances is an involuntary agent.

1 i.e., choice of Ends: see 3.2.1 note.

2 ‘Things’ seems to include persons, see example （3） below.

Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.

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