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[601a]
himself knowing nothing of the cobbler's art, what appears to be a cobbler
to him and likewise to those who know nothing but judge only by forms and
colors1?”
“Certainly.” “And similarly, I suppose, we
shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing but how to imitate, lays on
with words and phrases2
the colors of the several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant,
who see things only through words,3 will deem his words most excellent,
[601b]
whether he speak in rhythm, meter and harmony about
cobbling or generalship or anything whatever. So mighty is the spell4 that these adornments
naturally exercise; though when they are stripped bare of their musical
coloring and taken by themselves,5 I think you know what sort of a showing
these sayings of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed
them.” “I have,” he said. “Do they
not,” said I, “resemble the faces of adolescents, young
but not really beautiful, when the bloom of youth abandons them?6” “By all means,” he
said. “Come, then,” said I, “consider this
point: The creator of the phantom, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of
the reality but only the appearance.
[601c]
Is
not that so?” “Yes.” “Let us not,
then, leave it half said but consider it fully.” “Speak
on,” he said. “The painter, we say, will paint both
reins and a bit.” “Yes.” “But the
maker7 will be the
cobbler and the smith.” “Certainly.”
“Does the painter, then, know the proper quality of reins and bit?
Or does not even the maker, the cobbler and the smith, know that, but only
the man who understands the use of these things, the horseman8?” “Most true.” “And shall
we not say
[601d]
that the same holds true of
everything?” “What do you mean?”
“That there are some three arts concerned with everything, the
user's art,9 the maker's, and the imitator's.”
“Yes.” “Now do not the excellence, the beauty,
the rightness10 of every implement, living thing, and
action refer solely to the use11 for which each is made or by nature adapted?”
“That is so.” “It quite necessarily follows,
then, that the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by
experience, and that he reports to the maker the good or bad effects in use
of the thing he uses.
[601e]
As, for example,
the flute-player reports to the flute-maker which flutes respond and serve
rightly in flute-playing, and will order the kind that must be made, and the
other will obey and serve him.” “Of course.”
“The one, then, possessing knowledge, reports about the goodness
or the badness of the flutes, and the other, believing, will make
them.” “Yes.” “Then in respect of
the same implement the maker will have right belief12 about its excellence
and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to
listen to him,
1 For the association of χρώματα and σχήματα Cf. Phileb. 12 E. 47 A, 51 B, Laws 669 A, Soph. 251 A, Meno 75 A with Apelt's note, Cratyl. 431 C, Gorg. 465 B, Phaedo 100 D, Aristot.Poet. 1447 a 18-19.
2 Cf. Symp. 198 B, Apol. 17 C. The explicit discrimination of ὀνόματα as names of agents and ῥήματα as names of actions is peculiar to Soph. 262. But Cf. Cratyl. 431 B, 425 A, Theaet. 206 D. And in Soph. 257 Bῥήματι is used generally. See Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 56-57. Cf. Euthydem. 304 E with Symp. 187 A, Phaedr. 228 D, 271 C and my note in Class. Phil. xvii. (1922) p. 262.
3 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 240 A.
4 Cf. 607 C, Laws 840 C, Protag. 315 A-B.
5 Cf. Gorg. 502 Cεἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμόν, 392, Ion 530 b, Epicharmus apudDiog. Laert. iii. 17περιδύσας τὸ μέτρον ὃ νῦν ἔχει, Aeschines, In Ctes. 136περιελόντες τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ μέτρον, Isoc.Evag. 11τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ with Horace, Sat. i. 4. 62 “invenias etiam disiecti membra poetae,” Aristot.Rhet. 1404 a 24ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τήνδε τὴν δόξαν. Sext. Empir., Bekker, pp. 665-666 (Adv. Math. ii. 288), says that the ideas of poets are inferior to those of the ordinary layman. Cf. also Julian, Or. ii. 78 D, Coleridge, Table Talk: “If you take from Virgil his diction and metre what do you leave him?”
6 Aristot.Rhet. 1406 b 36 f. refers to this. Cf. Tyrtaeus 8 (6). 28ὄφρ᾽ ἐρατῆς ἥβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, Mimnermus i. 4 ἥβης ἄνθη γίγνεται ἁρπαλέα; Theognis 1305: παιδείας πλουηράτου ἄνθος ὠκύτερον σταδίου Xen.Symp. 8. 14τὸ μὲν τῆς ὥρας ἄνθος ταχὺ δήπου παρακμάζει, Plato, Symp. 183 Eτῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι
7 The δέ γε has almost the effect of a retort.
8 Cf. Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1094 a 10-11καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἡ χαλινοποιικὴ. . .
9 For the idea that the user knows best see Cratyl. 390 B, Euthydem. 289 B, Phaedr. 274 E. Zeller, Aristotle(Eng.) ii. p. 247, attributes this “pertinent observation” to Aristotle. Cf. Aristot.Pol. 1277 b 30αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος. See 1282 a 21, 1289 a 17. Coleridge, Table Talk: “In general those who do things for others know more about them than those for whom they are done. A groom knows more about horses than his master.” But Hazlitt disagrees with Plato's view.
10 So in Laws 669 A-B, Plato says that the competent judge of a work of art must know three things, first, what it is, second, that it is true and right, and third, that it is good.
11 For the reference of beauty to use see Hipp. Maj. 295 C ff.
12 πίστιν ὀρθήν is used because of πιστεύων above. It is a slightly derogatory synonym of δόξαν ὀρθήν below, 602 A. Cf. 511 E.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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