Plato, Republic

[345a] it will be no bad investment¹ for you—any benefit that you bestow on such company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitable² than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will.³ But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence,⁴ all the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice. [345b] Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice.” “And how am I to persuade you?”⁵ he said. “If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ram⁶ it into your head?” “Heaven forbid!” I said, “don't do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it,⁷ or if you shift your ground change openly and don't try to deceive us. [345c] But, as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—let us return to the previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd not with regard to what is best for the sheep but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them [345d] as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherd⁸ surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are entirely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd's art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule⁹ in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, [345e] alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulers¹⁰—willingly hold office and rule?” “I don't think,” he said, “I know right well they do.”

“But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule?