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When I had said this I supposed that I was done with the subject, but it all turned out to be only a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always an intrepid enterprising spirit in everything, would not on this occasion acquiesce in Thrasymachus's abandonment1 of his case, but said, “Socrates, is it your desire to seem to have persuaded us [357b] or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be just than unjust?” “Really,” I said, “if the choice rested with me.” “Well, then, you are not doing what you wish. For tell me: do you agree that there is a kind of good2 which we would choose to possess, not from desire for its after effects, but welcoming it for its own sake? As, for example, joy and such pleasures are harmless3 and nothing results from them afterwards save to have and to hold the enjoyment.” [357c] “I recognise that kind,” said I. “And again a kind that we love both for its own sake and for its consequences,4 such as understanding,5 sight, and health?6 For these presume we welcome for both reasons.” “Yes,” I said. “And can you discern a third form of good under which falls exercise and being healed when sick and the art of healing and the making of money generally? For of them we would say that they are laborious and painful yet beneficial, and for their own sake [357d] we would not accept them, but only for the rewards and other benefits that accrue from them.” “Why yes,” I said, “I must admit this third class also. But what of it?” “In which of these classes do you place justice?” he said.
1 So in Philebus 11 C, Philebus cries off or throws up the sponge in the argument.
2 Aristotle borrows this classification from Plato (Topics 118 b 20-22), but liking to differ from his teacher, says in one place that the good which is desired solely for itself is the highest. The Stoics apply the classification to “preferables” (Diogenes Laertius vii. 107). Cf. Hooker, Eccles. Pol. i. 11. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes goods of the soul, of the body, and of possessions (Laws 697 B, 727-729) or as the first Alcibiades puts it (131) the self, the things of the self, and other things.
3 Plato here speaks of harmless pleasures, from the point of view of common sense and prudential morality. Cf. Tim. 59 Dἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονήν, Milton's “Mirth that after no repenting draws.” But the Republic(583 D) like the Gorgias(493 E-494 C) knows the more technical distinction of the Philebus(42 C ff., 53 C ff.) between pure pleasures and impure, which are conditioned by desire and pain.
4 Isocrates i. 47 has this distinction, as well as Aristotle.
5 Some philosophers, as Aristippus (Diogenes Laertius x. 1. 138), said that intelligence is a good only for its consequences, but the opening sentences of Aritotle's Metaphysics treat all forms of knowledge as goods in themselves.
6 Plutarch (1040 C) says that Chrysippus censured Plato for recognizing health as a good, but elsewhere Plato explicitly says that even health is to be disregarded when the true interests of the soul require it.
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