Plato, Republic

[602a] but the user will have true knowledge.” “Certainly.” “And will the imitator from experience or use have knowledge whether the things he portrays are or are not beautiful and right, or will he, from compulsory association with the man who knows and taking orders from him for the right making of them, have right opinion¹?” “Neither.” “Then the imitator will neither know nor opine rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations.” “It seems not.” “Most charming,² then, would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in respect of true wisdom about his creations.” “Not at all.” [602b] “Yet still he will none the less³ imitate, though in every case he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant multitude.” “Why, what else?” “On this, then, as it seems, we are fairly agreed, that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play,⁴ not to be taken seriously,⁵ and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or heroic verse,⁶ are all altogether imitators.” “By all means.” [602c]

“In heaven's name, then, this business of imitation is concerned with the third remove from truth, is it not?” “Yes.” “And now again, to what element⁷ in man is its function and potency related?” “Of what are you speaking?” “Of this: The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far⁸ does not appear equal.” “Why, no.” “And the same things appear bent and straight⁹ to those who view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colors, and there is [602d] obviously every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so scene-painting in its exploitation¹⁰ of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of witchcraft,¹¹ and so do jugglery and many other such contrivances.” “True.” “And have not measuring and numbering and weighing¹² proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparently¹³ greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned¹⁴ and numbered or even weighed?” [602e] “Certainly.” “But this surely would be the function¹⁵ of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates.¹⁶” “Why, yes, of that.” “And often when this has measured¹⁷ and declares that certain things are larger or that some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at the same time an appearance of the contrary.” “Yes.” “And did we not say¹⁸ that it is impossible for the same thing at one time to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing?”