[484a]
Socrates
“So now, Glaucon,” I said,
“our argument after winding1 a long2 and
weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of
wisdom and who are not.” “Yes,” he said,
“a shorter way is perhaps not feasible.”
“Apparently not,” I said. “I, at any rate,
think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had
nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left
which our purpose3 of
discerning the difference between the just and
[484b]
the unjust life requires us to discuss.”
“What, then,” he said, “comes next?”
“What else,” said I, “but the next in order?
Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which
is eternal and unchanging,4
while those who are incapable of this but lose themselves and wander5 amid the
multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the
two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state?” “What,
then,” he said, “would be a fair statement of the
matter?” “Whichever,” I said,
“appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society,
[484c]
these we should establish as
guardians.” “Right” he said. “Is
this, then,” said I, “clear, whether the guardian who is
to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight?”
“Of course it is clear,” he said. “Do you
think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind6 and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the
veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern7
in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their
eyes8 on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal
and in the exactest possible contemplation of it
[484d]
establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful,
the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those
that are established?” “No, by heaven,” he
said, “there is not much difference.” “Shall
we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who
have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short
of the others in experience9 and are not second to them in
any part of virtue?” “It would be strange
indeed,” he said, “to choose others than the
philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for
this very knowledge
1 The argument is slightly personified. Cf. on 503 A.
2 It is captious to object that the actual discussion of the philosopher occupies only a few pages.
3 This is the main theme of the Republic, of which Plato never loses sight.
4 For κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος Cf. Phaedo 78 C, Soph. 248 A, Tim. 41 D, 82 B, Epin. 982 B and E.
5 Cf. p. 89, note h, on 505 C.
6 Cf. Luke vi. 39, Matt. xv. 14, John xix. 39-41.
7 Cf. Polit. 277 B, 277 D f., etc., Soph. 226 C, Parmen. 132 D.
8 ἀποβλέποντες belongs to the terminology of the ideas. Cf. 472 C, Cratyl. 389 A, Gorg. 503 E, Tim. 28 A, Prot. 354 C, and my What Plato Said, p. 458 on Euthyph. 6 E.
9 Cf. 539 E, 521 B, Phileb. 62. Cf. Introd. p. xl; Apelt, Republic, p. 490.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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