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[436a]
or the love of money1 which we might
say is not least likely to be found in Phoenicians2 and the population of Egypt.” “One certainly
might,” he replied. “This is the fact then,”
said I, “and there is no difficulty in recognizing it.”
“Certainly not.”“But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we
do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things
and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one
part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the
pleasures of nutrition
[436b]
and generation
and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul3
that we function in each case when we once begin. That is what is really
hard to determine properly.” “I think so too,”
he said. “Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide
whether they are identical with one another in this way.”
“How?” “It is obvious that the same thing will
never do or suffer opposites4 in the same
respect5 in relation to the same thing and at the
same time. So that if ever we find6 these contradictions in the
functions of the mind
[436c]
we shall know that
it was7 not the same
thing functioning but a plurality.” “Very
well.” “Consider, then, what I am saying.”
“Say on,” he replied. “Is it possible for the
same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at rest8 and in motion?”
“By no means.” “Let us have our understanding
still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute. If
anyone should say of a man standing still but moving his hands and head that
the same man is at the same time at rest and in motion we should not, I take
it, regard that as the right way of expressing it, but rather that a
part9 of him is at rest
[436d]
and a
part in motion. Is not that so?” “It is.”
“Then if the disputant should carry the jest still further with
the subtlety that tops at any rate10 stand still as a whole at the same time that they are
in motion when with the peg fixed in one point they revolve, and that the
same is true of any other case of circular motion about the same
spot—we should reject the statement on the ground that the repose
and the movement in such cases11 were not in relation to
the same parts of the objects, but we would say
[436e]
that there was a straight line and a circumference in
them and that in respect of the straight line they are standing still12 since they do not incline to either side, but in respect of the
circumference they move in a circle; but that when as they revolve they
incline the perpendicular to right or left or forward or back, then they are
in no wise at rest.” “And that would be
right,” he said. “No such remarks then will disconcert
us or any whit the more make us believe that it is ever possible for the
same thing at the same time in the same respect and the same relation
1 φιλοχρήματον is a virtual synonym of ἐπιθυμητικόν. Cf. 580 E and Phaedo 68 C, 82 C.
2 In Laws 747 C, Plato tells that for this or some other cause the mathematical education of the Phoenicians and Egyptians, which he commends, developed in them πανουργία rather than σοφία.
3 The questions debated by psychologists from Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1102 a 31) to the present day is still a matter of rhetoric, poetry, and point of view rather than of strict science. For some purposes we must treat the “faculties” of the mind as distinct entities, for others we must revert to the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Arnold's “Lines on Butler's Sermons” and my remarks in The Assault on Humanism. Plato himself is well aware of this, and in different dialogues emphasizes the aspect that suits his purpose. There is no contradiction between this passage and Phaedo 68 C, 82 C, and Republic x. 611-12. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 42-43.
4 The first formulation of the law of contradiction. Cf. Phaedo 102 E, Theaetetus 188 A, Soph. 220 B, 602 E. Sophistical objections are anticipated here and below (436 E) by attaching to it nearly all the qualifying distinctions of the categories which Aristotle wearily observes are necessary πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις（De interp. 17 a 36-37). Cf. Met. 1005 b 22πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας, and Rhet. ii. 24. Plato invokes the principle against Heraclitism and other philosophies of relativity and the sophistries that grew out of them or played with their formulas. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 50 ff., 53, 58, 68. Aristotle follows Plato in this, pronouncing it πασῶν βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή.
5 κατὰ ταὐτόν=in the same part or aspect of itself;πρὸς ταὐτόν=in relation to the same (other) thing. Cf. Sophist 230 Bἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας.
6 For this method of reasoning cf. 478 D, 609 B, Laws 896 C, Charmides 168 B-C, Gorgias 496 C, Philebus 11 D-E.
8 The maxim is applied to the antithesis of rest and motion, so prominent in the dialectics of the day. Cf. Sophist 249 C-D, Parmenides 156 D and passim.
9 Cf. Theaetetus 181 E.
10 The argumentative γε is controversial. For the illustration of the top cf. Spencer, First Principle, 170, who analyzes “certain oscillations described by the expressive though inelegant word 'wobbling'” and their final dissipation when the top appears stationary in the equilibrium mobile.
11 The meaning is plain, the alleged rest and motion do not relate to the same parts of the objects. But the syntax of τὰ τοιαῦτα is difficult. Obvious remedies are to expunge the words or to read τῶν τοιούτων, the cacophony of which in the context Plato perhaps rejected at the cost of leaving his syntax to our conjectures.
12 Cf. Aristotle Met. 1022 a 23ἔτι δὲ τὸ καθὸ τὸ κατὰ θέσιν λέγεται, καθὸ ἕστηκεν, etc,
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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