7.
We must not however rest content with stating this general definition, but must show that
it applies to the particular virtues. In practical philosophy, although universal
principles have a wider application,
1 those covering a particular part of the field
possess a higher degree of truth; because conduct deals with particular facts, and our
theories are bound to accord with these.
Let us then take the particular virtues from the diagram.
2
[
2]
The observance of the mean in fear and confidence is Courage. The man that exceeds in
fearlessness not designated by any special name (and this the case with many of
the virtues and vices); he that exceeds in confidence is Rash; he that exceeds in
fear and is deficient in confidence is Cowardly.
[
3]
In
respect of pleasures and pains—not all of them, and to a less degree in respect
of pains
3—the observance of the mean is Temperance, the excess
Profligacy. Men deficient in the enjoyment of pleasures scarcely occur, and hence this
character also has not been assigned a name, but we may call it Insensible.
[
4]
In regard to giving and getting money, the observance of the mean
is Liberality; the excess and deficiency are Prodigality and Meanness,
4 but the prodigal man and the mean man exceed and
fall short in opposite ways to one another: the prodigal exceeds in giving and is
deficient in getting, whereas the mean man exceeds in getting and is deficient in giving.
[
5]
For the present then we describe these qualities in
outline and summarily, which is enough for the purpose in hand; but they will be more
accurately defined later.
[
6]
There are also other dispositions in relation to money, namely, the mode of observing the
mean called Magnificence (the magnificent man being different from the liberal,
as the former deals with large amounts and the latter with small ones), the
excess called Tastelessness or Vulgarity, and the defect called Paltriness. These are not the same as Liberality and the
vices corresponding to it; but the way in which they differ will be discussed
later.
[
7]
In respect of honor and dishonor, the observance of the mean is Greatness of Soul, the
excess a sort of Vanity, as it may be called, and the deficiency, Smallness of Soul.
[
8]
And just as we said that Liberality is related to
Magnificence, differing from it in being concerned with small amounts of money, so there
is a certain quality related to Greatness of Soul, which is concerned with great honors,
while this quality itself is concerned with small honors; for it is possible to aspire to
minor honors in the right way, or more than is right, or less. He who exceeds in these
aspirations is called ambitious, he who is deficient, unambitious; but the middle
character has no name, and the dispositions of these persons are also unnamed, except that
that of the ambitious man is called Ambitiousness. Consequently the extreme characters put
in a claim to the middle position, and in fact we ourselves sometimes call the middle
person ambitious and sometimes unambitious: we sometimes praise a man for being ambitious,
sometimes for being unambitious.
[
9]
Why we do so shall be
discussed later; for the present let us classify the remaining virtues and vices on the
lines which we have laid down.
[
10]
In respect of anger also we have excess, deficiency, and the observance of the mean.
These states are virtually without names, but as we call a person of the middle character
gentle, let us name the observance of the mean Gentleness, while of the extremes, he that
exceeds may be styled irascible and his vice Irascibility, and he that is deficient,
spiritless, and the deficiency Spiritlessness.
[
11]
There are also three other modes of observing a mean which bear some resemblance to each
other, and yet are different; all have to do with intercourse in conversation and action,
but they differ in that one is concerned with truthfulness of speech and behavior, and the
other with pleasantness, in its two divisions of pleasantness in social amusement and
pleasantness in the general affairs of life. We must then discuss these qualities also, in
order the better to discern that in all things the observance of the mean is to be
praised, while the extremes are neither right nor praiseworthy, but reprehensible. Most of
these qualities also are unnamed, but in these as in the other cases we must attempt to
coin names for them ourselves, for the sake of clearness and so that our meaning may be
easily followed.
[
12]
In respect of truth then, the middle character may
be called truthful, and the observance of the mean Truthfulness
5;
pretence in the form of exaggeration is Boastfulness, and its possessor a boaster; in the
form of understatement, Self-depreciation, and its possessor the
self-depreciator.
[
13]
In respect of pleasantness and social amusement, the middle character is witty and the
middle disposition Wittiness; the excess is Buffoonery and its possessor a buffoon; the
deficient man may be called boorish, and his disposition Boorishness. In respect of
general pleasantness in life, the man who is pleasant in the proper manner is friendly,
and the observance of the mean is Friendliness; he that exceeds, if from no interested
motive, is obsequious, if for his own advantage, a flatterer; he that is deficient, and
unpleasant in all the affairs of life, may be called quarrelsome and surly.
[
14]
There are also modes of observing a mean in the sphere of and in relation to the
emotions. For
6 in these also one man is spoken of as moderate and another as
excessive—for example the bashful man whose modesty takes alarm at everything;
while he that is deficient in shame, or abashed at nothing whatsoever, is shameless, and
the man of middle character modest. For though Modesty is not a virtue, it is praised, and
so is the modest man.
[
15]
Again, Righteous Indignation is the observance of a mean between Envy and Malice,
7 and these qualities are concerned with
pain and pleasure felt at the fortunes of one's neighbors. The righteously indignant man
is pained by undeserved good fortune; the jealous man exceeds him and is pained by all the
good fortune of others;
8 while the
malicious man so far falls short of being pained that he actually feels
pleasure.
[
16]
These qualities however it will be time to discuss in another place. After them we will
treat Justice,
9 distinguishing its two
kinds—for it has more than one sense—and showing in what way each is a
mode of observing the mean. [And we will deal similarly with the logical
virtues.
10]