E.C. Marchant, Commentary on Thucydides: Book 3

μεμφομένους—equivalent to μεμφομένους καὶ ἀξιοῦν- τας, the brachylogy being made easier by the preceding τοὺς προθέντας τὴν δ., the persons censured.

δύο . . ὀργήν—some make τάχος τε καὶ ὀργήν subj. of εἶναι, removing the comma, comparing cc. 40, 2, 57, 3, 75, 1. The parallels do not seem to prove the point.

τὸ μέν=τάχος. This passage is directly aimed at Cleon, who had deprecated χρόνου διατριβήν, thus showing his own follv, and had displayed the vehemence to which the ignorant and shallow-minded are pione.

γίγνεσθαι ‘to be found.’

μὴ διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων γ.—‘are not to explain affairs,’ i.e. how they are to be conducted.

λόγοι personified, like πειθώ. διαμάχομαι as in c. 40.

ἰδίᾳ τι αὐτῷ διαφέρει—‘he has some private interest.’

φράσαι—‘give guidance.’

τι αἰσχρὸν πεῖσαι—‘to carry a disgraceful proposal.’ Cf. c. 59, 2. οὐκ . . ἡγεῖται—οὐ can appear after εἰ . . μέν, provided the indic. is used, as in I. 121 εἰ οἱ μὲν . . οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, Xen. Anab. VII. 1, 29 εἰ βάρβαρον μὲν πόλιν οὐδεμίαν ἠθελήσαμεν κατασχεῖν.

εὖ δὲ διαβαλών—Cleon got a name for skill in διαβολή, as several passages in Aristoph. Equites show.

χαλεπώτατοι δὲ . . ἐπίδειξίν τινα—‘most difficult to meet are those in particular (καί) who by anticipation impute (to an opponent) a sort of rhetorical display to get money.’ χαλεπώτατοι does not mean to exclude the εὖ διαβαλών, who also—as the καί shows—is χαλεπώτατος as imputing to his opponent a desire to display his rhetorical skill; cf. c. 38, 2. But those who say that bribery is the motive are singled out. The emphasis is on ἐπὶ χρήμασι, which accordingly is in an unusual order: it belongs to ἐπίδειξιν. The point of τινα is that an ἐπίδειξις proper was not delivered in the Ecclesia.

ἀξυνετώτερος . . ἀδικώτερος—‘judged more of a fool than a knave.’ The double compar. as regularly where two qualities in the same ohject are contrasted: ἰὼ στρατηγοὶ πλέονες ἢ βελτίονες.

μετὰ ἀξυνεσίας—‘besides his (seeming) folly,’ a characteristic substitute for μετὰ τοῦ ἀξύνετος γίγνεσθαι.

ἂν πεισθεῖεν—viz. the state. The change to plur. is made easy by the intervention of τῶν πολιτῶν.

ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ‘on equal terms,’ is parallel to ἐκφοβοῦντα.

σώφρονα—a very moderate criticism of the dangerous tendency now manifesting itself in Athenian public life, since the death of Pericles, to give too much weight to the πιθανώτατοι (c. 36, 6). σώφρων was esp. associated with those opposed to extreme democracy; cf. c. 62, 4. For τῷ πλεῖστα εὖ βουλεύοντι, ‘he whose connsel is generally good,’ we should expect, at first sight, something like τῷ πιστὰ ξυμβουλεύοντι (conjectnred by Weil), ‘he whose counsel is followed,’ in contrast with τὸν μὴ τυχόντα γνώμης, in the sense, ‘he whose advice is rejected’; cf πείσας and μὴ τυχών in § 3, κατορθῶν and ἐπιτυχών below. But in stating the principle that ought to be followed, the moderate Diodotus criticizes what the people professed to wish, viz. to reward good (not merely persuasive) counsellors. But in rewards the persuasive was mistaken for the good. And τὸν μὴ τυχόντα γνώμης is no doubt intentionally ambiguous, for, in contrast with πείσας, it does mean ‘he who fails to carry his opinion’; but, in contrast with τῷ εὖ βουλεύοντι, ‘not fortunate in his advice’ means ‘wrong’ ‘Who fails in counsel’ will keep up the two meanings. Cf. Aesch. PV. 204 τὰ λῷστα βουλεύων πιθεῖν . . οὐκ ἠδυνήθην. (The intentional ambiguity of this passage has escaped notice.)

ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἐλασσοῦν—‘but not to curtail . . either,’ as might happen in the case of his being charged with corruption.

οὐχ ὅπως . . ἀλλὰ μηδέ—non modo (non) . . sed ne . . quidem. For the sentiment cf. Demosth. III. 18 οὐ λέγει τις τὰ βέλτιστα; άναστὰς ἄλλος ειπάτω, μὴ τοῦτον αἰτιάσθω.

πρὸς χάριν—‘to please’ the people.

ὀρέγοιτο—sc. ἥκιστα ἄν. τῷ αὐτῷ is explained by χαριζόμενος κτλ.