[
1003a]
[21]
There is a science which studies Being
qua Being, and the properties inherent in
it in virtue of its own nature. This science is not the same as any of
the so-called particular sciences, for none of the others contemplates
Being generally qua Being; they divide off some
portion of it and study the attribute of this portion, as do for
example the mathematical sciences.But since it is for the first principles and
the most ultimate causes that we are searching, clearly they must
belong to something in virtue of its own nature. Hence if these
principles were investigated by those also who investigated the
elements of existing things, the elements must be elements of Being
not incidentally, but qua Being. Therefore it
is of Being qua Being that we too must grasp
the first causes.
The term "being" is used in various
senses, but with reference to one central idea and one definite
characteristic, and not as merely a common epithet. Thus as the term
"healthy" always relates to health (either as preserving it or as
producing it or as indicating it or as receptive of it),
[
1003b]
[1]
and as
"medical" relates to the art of medicine (either as possessing it or
as naturally adapted for it or as being a function of
medicine)—and we shall find other terms used similarly to
these—so
"being " is used in various senses, but always with reference to one
principle. For some things are said to "be" because they are
substances; others because they are modifications of substance; others
because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or
privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of
substance or of terms relating to substance, or negations of certain
of these terms or of substance. (Hence we even say that not-being
is not-being.)And so, just as there is one science of all
healthy things, so it is true of everything else. For it is not only
in the case of terms which express one common notion that the
investigation belongs to one science, but also in the case of terms
which relate to one particular characteristic; for the latter too, in
a sense, express one common notion. Clearly then the study of things
which
are, qua being, also belongs to one
science.Now in every
case knowledge is principally concerned with that which is primary,
i.e. that upon which all other things depend, and from which they get
their names. If, then, substance is this primary thing, it is of
substances that the philosopher must grasp the first principles and
causes.
Now of every single class
of things, as there is one perception,
[20]
so there is one science: e.g., grammar, which is
one science, studies all articulate sounds.Hence the study of all the species of Being
qua Being belongs to a science which is
generically one, and the study of the several species of Being belongs
to the specific parts of that science.
Now if Being and Unity are the same, i.e. a single nature, in the
sense that they are associated as principle and cause are, and not as
being denoted by the same definition (although it makes no difference
but rather helps our argument if we understand them in the same
sense),since "one
man" and "man" and "existent man" and "man" are the same thing, i.e.
the duplication in the statement "he is a man and an
existent man" gives no fresh meaning (clearly the
concepts of humanity and existence are not dissociated in respect of
either coming to be or ceasing to be), and similarly in the case of
the term "one," so that obviously the additional term in these phrases
has the same significance, and Unity is nothing distinct from
Being;and further if
the substance of each thing is one in no accidental sense, and
similarly is of its very nature something which is—then
there are just as many species of Being as of Unity. And to study the
essence of these species (I mean, e.g., the study of Same and Other
and all the other similar concepts—roughly speaking all the "contraries" are
reducible to this first principle;
[
1004a]
[1]
but we may consider
that they have been sufficiently studied in the "Selection of
Contraries"
1) is the province of a science which is
generically one.
And there are just as
many divisions of philosophy as there are kinds of substance; so that
there must be among them a First Philosophy and one which follows upon
it.For Being and
Unity at once entail genera, and so the sciences will correspond to
these genera. The term "philosopher" is like the term "mathematician"
in its uses; for mathematics too has divisions—there is a
primary and a secondary science, and others successively, in the realm
of mathematics.
Now since it is the province of one
science to study opposites, and the opposite of unity is plurality,
and it is the province of one science to study the negation and
privation of Unity, because in both cases we are studying Unity, to
which the negation (or privation) refers, stated either in the simple
form that Unity is not present, or in the form that it is not present
in a particular class; in the latter case Unity is modified by the
differentia, apart from the content of the negation (for the negation
of Unity is its absence); but in privation there is a substrate of
which the privation is predicated.—The opposite of Unity, then, is
Plurality; and so the opposites of the above-mentioned
concepts—Otherness, Dissimilarity, Inequality and everything
else which is derived from these or from Plurality or
Unity—
[20]
fall
under the cognizance of the aforesaid science. And one of them is
Oppositeness; for this is a form of Difference, and Difference is a
form of Otherness.Hence
since the term "one" is used in various senses, so too will these
terms be used; yet it pertains to one science to take cognizance of
them all. For terms fall under different sciences, not if they are
used in various senses, but if their definitions are neither identical
nor referable to a common notion.And since everything is referred to that which
is primary, e.g. all things which are called "one" are referred to the
primary "One," we must admit that this is also true of Identity and
Otherness and the Contraries. Thus we must first distinguish all the
senses in which each term is used, and then attribute them to the
primary in the case of each predicate, and see how they are related to
it; for some will derive their name from possessing and others from
producing it, and others for similar reasons.
Thus
clearly it pertains to one science to give an account both of these
concepts and of substance (this was one of the questions raised in
the "Difficulties"
2), and it is the function of
the philosopher to be able to study all subjects.
[
1004b]
[1]
If this is not
so, who is it who in will investigate whether "
Socrates" and "
Socrates seated" are the same
thing; or whether one thing has one contrary, or what the contrary is,
or how many meanings it has?
3 and similarly with all other such
questions.Thus
since these are the essential modifications of Unity qua Unity and of Being qua Being,
and not qua numbers or lines or fire, clearly
it a pertains to that science
4 to discover both the
essence and the attributes of these concepts.And those who investigate them err, not
in being unphilosophical, but because the substance, of which they
have no real knowledge, is prior. For just as number qua number has its peculiar modifications, e.g. oddness
and evenness, commensurability and equality, excess and defect, and
these things are inherent in numbers both considered independently and
in relation to other numbers; and as similarly other peculiar
modifications are inherent in the solid and the immovable and the
moving and the weightless and that which has weight; so Being qua Being has certain peculiar modifications,
and it is about these that it is the philosopher's function to
discover the truth. And here is evidence of this fact.Dialecticians and sophists
wear the same appearance as the philosopher, for sophistry is Wisdom
in appearance only, and dialecticians discuss all subjects,
[20]
and Being is a subject common to
them all; but clearly they discuss these concepts because they
appertain to philosophy.For sophistry and dialectic are concerned with the same class of
subjects as philosophy, but philosophy differs from the former in the
nature of its capability and from the latter in its outlook on life.
Dialectic treats as an exercise what philosophy tries to understand,
and sophistry seems to be philosophy; but is not.
Further, the second column of contraries is privative, and
everything is reducible to Being and Not being, and Unity and
Plurality; e.g. Rest falls under Unity and Motion under Plurality. And
nearly everyone agrees that substance and existing things are composed
of contraries; at any rate all speak of the first principles as
contraries—some as Odd and Even,
5 some as Hot and Cold,
6 some
as Limit and Unlimited,
7 some as Love and Strife.
8 And it is
apparent that all other things also are reducible to Unity and
Plurality (we may assume this reduction);
[
1005a]
[1]
and
the principles adduced by other thinkers fall entirely under these as
genera.It is clear,
then, from these considerations also, that it pertains to a single
science to study Being qua Being; for all
things are either contraries or derived from contraries, and the first
principles of the contraries are Unity and Plurality. And these belong
to one science, whether they have reference to one common notion or
not. Probably the truth is that they have not; but nevertheless even
if the term "one" is used in various senses, the others will be
related to the primary sense (and similarly with the
contraries)—even if Being or Unity is not a universal and
the same in all cases, or is not separable from particulars (as it
presumably is not; the unity is in some cases one of reference and in
others one of succession). For this very reason it is not the function
of the geometrician to inquire what is Contrariety or Completeness or
Being or Unity or Identity or Otherness, but to proceed from the
assumption of them.
Clearly, then, it pertains to one
science to study Being qua Being, and the
attributes inherent in it qua Being; and the
same science investigates, besides the concepts mentioned above,
Priority and Posteriority, Genus and Species, Whole and Part, and all
other such concepts.
We must pronounce whether it pertains
to the same science
[20]
to study
both the so-called axioms in mathematics and substance, or to
different sciences. It is obvious that the investigation of these
axioms too pertains to one science, namely the science of the
philosopher; for they apply to all existing things, and not to a
particular class separate and distinct from the rest. Moreover all
thinkers employ them—because they are axioms of Being qua Being, and every genus possesses
Being—but
employ them only in so far as their purposes require; i.e., so far as
the genus extends about which they are carrying out their proofs.
Hence since these axioms apply to all things qua Being (for this is what is common to them), it is the
function of him who studies Being qua Being to
investigate them as well.For this reason no one who is pursuing a particular
inquiry—neither a geometrician nor an
arithmetician—attempts to state whether they are true or
false; but some of the physicists did so, quite naturally; for they
alone professed to investigate nature as a whole, and Being.But inasmuch as there is a more
ultimate type of thinker than the natural philosopher (for nature is
only a genus of Being), the investigation of these axioms too will
belong to the universal thinker who studies the primary reality.
[
1005b]
[1]
Natural philosophy is a kind of Wisdom,
but not the primary kind.As for the attempts of some of those who discuss how the truth
should be received, they are due to lack of training in logic; for
they should understand these things before they approach their task,
and not investigate while they are still learning.Clearly then it is the function of the
philosopher, i.e. the student of the whole of reality in its essential
nature, to investigate also the principles of syllogistic reasoning.
And it is proper for him who best understands each class of subject to
be able to state the most certain principles of that subject; so that
he who understands the modes of Being qua Being
should be able to state the most certain principles of all
things.Now this
person is the philosopher, and the most certain principle of all is
that about which one cannot be mistaken; for such a principle must be
both the most familiar (for it is about the unfamiliar that errors are
always made), and not based on hypothesis.For the principle which the student of any
form of Being must grasp is no hypothesis; and that which a man must
know if he knows anything he must bring with him to his
task.
Clearly, then, it is a
principle of this kind that is the most certain of all principles. Let
us next state
what this principle is."It is impossible for the same
attribute at once to belong and not to belong
[20]
to the same thing and in the same
relation"; and we must add any further qualifications that may be
necessary to meet logical objections. This is the most certain of all
principles, since it possesses the required definition;for it is impossible for
anyone to suppose that the same thing is and is not, as some imagine
that Heraclitus says
9—for what a man says does not
necessarily represent what he believes.And if it is impossible for contrary
attributes to belong at the same time to the same subject (the usual
qualifications must be added to this premiss also), and an opinion
which contradicts another is contrary to it, then clearly it is
impossible for the same man to suppose at the same time that the same
thing is and is not; for the man who made this error would entertain
two contrary opinions at the same time.Hence all men who are demonstrating anything
refer back to this as an ultimate belief; for it is by nature the
starting-point of all the other axioms as well.
There
are some, however, as we have said, who both state themselves that the
same thing can be and not be,
[
1006a]
[1]
and say that it is
possible to hold this view. Many even of the physicists adopt this
theory. But we have just assumed that it is impossible at once to be
and not to be, and by this means we have proved that this is the most
certain of all principles.Some, indeed, demand to have the law proved, but this is because
they lack education
10; for it shows lack of education not to know of
what we should require proof, and of what we should not. For it is
quite impossible that everything should have a proof; the process
would go on to infinity, so that even so there would be no proof.
11 If on the other hand there are
some things of which no proof need be sought, they cannot say what
principle they think to be more self-evident. Even in the case of this
law, however, we can demonstrate the impossibility by refutation, if
only our opponent makes some statement. If he makes none, it is absurd
to seek for an argument against one who has no arguments of his own
about anything, in so far as he has none; for such a person, in so far
as he is such, is really no better than a vegetable.And I say that proof by refutation
differs from simple proof in that he who attempts to prove might seem
to beg the fundamental question, whereas if the discussion is provoked
thus by someone else, refutation and not proof will result.The starting-point for all such
discussions is not the claim that he should state that something is or
is not so
[20]
(because this
might be supposed to be a begging of the question), but that he should
say something significant both to himself and to another (this is
essential if any argument is to follow; for otherwise such a person
cannot reason either with himself or with another);and if this is granted, demonstration
will be possible, for there will be something already defined. But the
person responsible is not he who demonstrates but he who acquiesces;
for though he disowns reason he acquiesces to reason. Moreover, he who
makes such an admission as this has admitted the truth of something
apart from demonstration [so that not everything will be "so and not
so"].
Thus in the first place it is obvious that
this at any rate is true: that the term "to be" or "not to be" has a
definite meaning; so that not everything can be "so and not so."
Again, if "man" has one meaning, let this be "two-footed
animal."By "has one
meaning" I mean this: if X means "man," then if anything is a man, its
humanity will consist in being X. And it makes no difference even if
it be said that "man" has several meanings, provided that they are
limited in number;
[
1006b]
[1]
for one could assign a different
name to each formula.For
instance, it might be said that "man" has not one meaning but several,
one of which has the formula "two-footed animal," and there might be
many other formulae as well, if they were limited in number; for a
particular name could be assigned to each for formula.If on the other hand it be
said that "man" has an infinite number of meanings, obviously there
can be no discourse; for not to have one meaning is to have no
meaning, and if words have no meaning there is an end of discourse
with others, and even, strictly speaking, with oneself; because it is
impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing; and
even if this were possible, one name might be assigned to that of
which we think.Now let
this name, as we said at the beginning, have a meaning; and let it
have one meaning. Now it is impossible that "being man" should have
the same meaning as "not being man," that is, if "man" is not merely
predicable of one subject but has one meaning(for we do not identify "having one
meaning" with "being predicable of one subject," since in this case
"cultured" and "white" and "man" would have one meaning, and so all
things would be one; for they would all have the same meaning). And it
will be impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, except by
equivocation, as e.g. one whom we call "man"
[20]
others might call "not-man";but the problem is whether the
same thing can at once be and not be "man," not in
name ,
but in
fact . If "man" and "not-man" have not different
meanings, clearly "not being a man" will mean nothing different from
"being a man"; and so "being a man" will be "not being a man"; they
will be one.For "to be
one" means, as in the case of "garment" and "coat," that the formula
is one. And if "being man" and "being not-man" are to be one, they
will have the same meaning; but it has been proved above that they
have different meanings. If then anything can be truly said to be
"man," it must be "two-footed animal"; for this is what "man" was
intended to mean.And if
this is necessarily so, it is impossible that at the same time the
same thing should not be "two-footed animal." For "to be necessarily
so" means this: that it is impossible not to be so. Thus it cannot be
true to say at the same time that the same thing is and is not
man.And the same
argument holds also in the case of not being man;
[
1007a]
[1]
because "being man" and "being not-man" have different meanings if
"being white" and "being man" have different meanings (for the
opposition is much stronger in the former case so as to produce
different meanings).And
if we are told that "white" too means one and the same thing,
12
we shall say again just what we said before,
13 that in that case all things, and not merely
the opposites, will be one. But if this is impossible, what we have
stated follows; that is, if our opponent answers our question; but if
when asked the simple question he includes in his answer the
negations, he is not answering our question.There is nothing to prevent the same thing
from being "man" and "white" and a multitude of other things; but
nevertheless when asked whether it is true to say that X is man, or
not, one should return an answer that means one thing, and not add
that X is white and large. It is indeed impossible to enumerate all
the infinity of accidents; and so let him enumerate either all or
none.Similarly
therefore, even if the same thing is ten thousand times "man" and
"not-man," one should not include in one's answer to the question
whether it is "man" that it is at the same time also "not-man," unless
one is also bound to include in one's answer all the other accidental
things that the subject is or is not.
[20]
And if one does this, he is not arguing
properly.
In general those who
talk like this do away with substance and essence,for they are compelled to assert that
all things are accidents, and that there is no such thing as "being
essentially man" or "animal." For if there is to be such a thing as
"being essentially man," this will not be "being not-man" nor
"not-being man" (and yet these are negations of it); for it was
intended to have one meaning, i.e. the substance of
something.But to
denote a substance means that the essence is that and nothing else;
and if for it "being essentially man" is the same as either "being
essentially not-man" or "essentially not-being man," the essence will
be something else.Thus
they are compelled to say that nothing can have such a definition as
this, but that all things are accidental; for this is the distinction
between substance and accident: "white" is an accident of "man,"
because although he is white, he is not white in essence.And since the accidental
always implies a predication about some subject, if all statements are
accidental, there will be nothing primary about which they are made;
[
1007b]
[1]
so the predication must proceed to
infinity. But this is impossible, for not even more than two accidents
can be combined in predication. An accident cannot be an accident of
an accident unless both are accidents of the same thing.I mean, e.g., that "white" is
"cultured" and "cultured" "white" merely because both are accidents of
a man. But it is not in this sense—that both terms are
accidents of something else—that
Socrates is cultured. Therefore
since some accidents are predicated in the latter and some in the
former sense, such as are predicated in the way that "white" is of
Socrates cannot be an
infinite series in the upper direction; e.g. there cannot be another
accident of "white Socrates,"
for the sum of these predications does not make a single
statement.Nor can
"white " have a further accident, such as "cultured"; for the former
is no more an accident of the latter than vice versa; and besides we
have distinguished that although some predicates are accidental in
this sense, others are accidental in the sense that "cultured" is to
Socrates; and whereas
in the former case the accident is an accident of an accident, it is
not so in the latter; and thus not all predications will be of
accidents.Therefore
even so there will be something which denotes substance. And if this
is so, we have proved that contradictory statements cannot be
predicated at the same time.
Again, if
all contradictory predications of the same subject at the same time
are true, clearly all things will be one.
[20]
For if
it is equally possible either to affirm or deny anything of anything,
the same thing will be a trireme and a wall and a man; which is what
necessarily follows for those who hold the theory of Protagoras.
14 For if anyone thinks that a man is not
a trireme, he is clearly not a trireme; and so he also is a trireme if
the contradictory statement is true.And the result is the dictum of Anaxagoras,
"all things mixed together"
15; so that nothing truly exists. It seems, then, that they are
speaking of the Indeterminate; and while they think that they are
speaking of what exists, they are really speaking of what does not;
for the Indeterminate is that which exists potentially but not
actually.But indeed
they must admit the affirmation or negation of any predicate of any
subject, for it is absurd that in the case of each term its own
negation should be true, and the negation of some other term which is
not true of it should not be true. I mean, e.g., that if it is true to
say that a man is not a man, it is obviously also true to say that he
is or is not a trireme.Then if the affirmation is true, so must the negation be true; but
if the affirmation is not true the negation will be even truer than
the negation of the original term itself.
[
1008a]
[1]
Therefore if the latter negation is true, the negation of "trireme"
will also be true; and if this is true, the affirmation will be true
too.
And not only does this follow
for those who hold this theory, but also that it is not necessary
either to affirm or to deny a statement.For if it is true that X is both man and
not-man, clearly he will be neither man nor not-man; for to the two
statements there correspond two negations, and if the former is taken
as a single statement compounded out of two, the latter is also a
single statement and opposite to it.
Again, either
this applies to all terms, and the same thing is both white and
not-white, and existent and non-existent, and similarly with all other
assertions and negations; or it does not apply to all, but only to
some and not to others.And if it does not apply to all, the exceptions will be
admitted
16; but if it does apply to
all, again either (a) the negation will be true wherever the
affirmation is true, and the affirmation will be true wherever the
negation is true, or (d) the negation will be true wherever the
assertion is true, but the assertion will not always be true where the
negation is true. And in
the latter case there will be something which definitely is not, and
this will be a certain belief; and if that it is not is certain and
knowable, the opposite assertion will be still more knowable. But if
what is denied can be equally truly asserted, it must be either true
or false to state the predicates separately and say, e.g.,
[20]
that a thing is white, and again
that it is not-white.And
if it is not-true to state them separately, our opponent does not say
what he professes to say, and nothing exists; and how can that which
does not exist speak or walk?
17 And again all things will be one, as we
said before,
18
and the same thing will be "man" and "God" and "trireme" and the
negations of these terms.For if it is equally possible to assert or deny anything of
anything, one thing will not differ from another; for if anything does
differ, it will be true and unique. And similarly even if it is
possible to make a true statement while separating the predicates,
what we have stated follows. Moreover it follows that all statements
would be true and all false; and that our opponent himself admits that
what he says is false. Besides, it is obvious that discussion with him
is pointless, because he makes no real statement.For he says neither "yes" nor "no," but
"yes and no"; and again he denies both of these and says "neither yes
nor no"; otherwise there would be already some definite
statement.
Again, if when the
assertion is true the negation is false, and when the latter is true
the affirmation is false, it will be impossible to assert and deny
with truth the same thing at the same time.
[
1008b]
[1]
But perhaps it
will be said that this is the point at issue.
Again, is the man wrong who supposes that a thing
is so or not so, and he who supposes both right? If he is right, what
is the meaning of saying that "such is the nature of reality"?
19 And if he is not
right, but is more right than the holder of the first view, reality
will at once have a definite nature, and this will be true, and not at
the same time not-true.And if all men are equally right and wrong, an exponent of this view
can neither speak nor mean anything, since at the same time he says
both "yes" and "no." And if he forms no judgement, but "thinks" and
"thinks not" indifferently, what difference will there be between him
and the vegetables?
Hence it is quite
evident that no one, either of those who profess this theory or of any
other school, is really in this position.Otherwise, why does a man walk to
Megara and not stay at home, when
he thinks he ought to make the journey? Why does he not walk early one
morning into a well or ravine, if he comes to it, instead of clearly
guarding against doing so, thus showing that he does
not
think that it is equally good and not good to fall in? Obviously then
he judges that the one course is better and the other worse.And if this is so, he must
judge that one thing is man and another not man,
[20]
and that one thing is sweet and another
not sweet. For when, thinking that it is desirable to drink water and
see a man, he goes to look for them, he does not look for and judge
all things indifferently; and yet he should, if the same thing were
equally man and not-man.But as we have said, there is no one who does not evidently avoid
some things and not others. Hence, as it seems, all men form
unqualified judgements, if not about all things, at least about what
is better or worse.And if
they do this by guesswork and without knowledge, they should be all
the more eager for truth; just as a sick man should be more eager for
health than a healthy man; for indeed the man who guesses, as
contrasted with him who knows, is not in a healthy relation to the
truth.
Again, however much things may be "so and not
so," yet differences of degree are inherent in the nature of things.
For we should not say that 2 and 3 are equally even; nor are he who
thinks that 4 is 5, and he who thinks it is 1000, equally wrong: hence
if they are not equally wrong, the one is clearly less wrong, and so
more right.If then that
which has more the nature of something is nearer to that something,
[
1009a]
[1]
there will be some truth to which the
more true is nearer. And even if there is not, still there is now
something more certain and true, and we shall be freed from the
undiluted doctrine which precludes any mental determination.
From the same view proceeds the theory of Protagoras, and both alike
must be either true or false. For if all opinions and appearances are
true, everything must be at once true and false; for many people form
judgements which are opposite to those of others, and imagine that
those who do not think the same as themselves are wrong: hence the
same thing must both be and not be.And if this is so, all opinions must be true;
for those who are wrong and those who are right think contrarily to
each other. So if reality is of this nature, everyone will be
right.
Clearly then both these
theories proceed from the same mental outlook. But the method of
approach is not the same for all cases; for some require persuasion
and others compulsion.The
ignorance of those who have formed this judgement through perplexity
is easily remedied, because we are dealing
[20]
not with the theory but with their
mental outlook; but those who hold the theory for its own sake can
only be cured by refuting the theory as expressed in their own speech
and words.
This view comes to those who are perplexed
from their observation of sensible things. (1.) The belief that
contradictions and contraries can be true at the same time comes to
them from seeing the contraries generated from the same
thing.Then if what
is not cannot be generated, the thing must have existed before as both
contraries equally—just as Anaxagoras says
20 that everything is mixed in
everything; and also Democritus, for he too says
21 that Void and Plenum are present
equally in any part, and yet the latter
is , and the
former
is not.To those, then, who base their judgement on these considerations, we
shall say that although in one sense their theory is correct, in
another they are mistaken. For "being" has two meanings, so that there
is a sense in which something can be generated from "not-being," and a
sense in which it cannot; and a sense in which the same thing can at
once be and not be; but not in the same respect. For the same thing
can "be" contraries at the same time potentially, but not
actually.And
further, we shall request them to conceive another kind also of
substance of existing things, in which there is absolutely no motion
or destruction or generation.
[
1009b]
[1]
And (2.) similarly
the theory that there is truth in appearances has come to some people
from an observation of sensible things.They think that the truth should not be judged
by the number or fewness of its upholders; and they say that the same
thing seems sweet to some who taste it, and bitter to others; so that
if all men were diseased or all insane, except two or three who were
healthy or sane, the latter would seem to be diseased or insane, and
not the others.And further
they say that many of the animals as well get from the same things
impressions which are contrary to ours, and that the individual
himself does not always think the same in matters of sense-perception.
Thus it is uncertain which of these impressions are true or false; for
one kind is no more true than another, but equally so. And hence
Democritus says
22 that either there is no truth or we cannot
discover it.
And in general it is because they suppose that
thought is sense-perception, and sense-perception physical alteration,
that they say that the impression given through sense-perception is
necessarily true; for it is on these grounds that both Empedocles and
Democritus and practically all the rest have become obsessed by such
opinions as these.For
Empedocles says that those who change their bodily condition change
their thought:
For according to that
which is present to them doth thought increase in men.
23And in another passage he says:
[20]
And as
they change into a different nature, so it ever comes to them to think
differently.
24And Parmenides too declares in
the same way:
For as each at any time
hath the temperament of his many-jointed limbs, so thought comes to
men. For for each and every man the substance of his limbs is that
very thing which thinks; for thought is that which preponderates.
25There is also
recorded a saying of Anaxagoras to some of his disciples, that things
would be for them as they judged them to be.And they say that in Homer too clearly held
this view, because he made
Hector,
26 when he was stunned by the blow, lie
with thoughts deranged—thus implying that even those who are
"out of their minds" still think, although not the same thoughts.
Clearly then, if both are kinds of thought, reality also will be "both
so and not so."It is
along this path that the consequences are most difficult; for if those
who have the clearest vision of such truth as is possible (and these
are they who seek and love it most) hold such opinions and make these
pronouncements about the truth, surely those who are trying to be
philosophers may well despair; for the pursuit of truth will be
"chasing birds in the air."
27
[
1010a]
[1]
But the reason why these men hold this
view is that although they studied the truth about reality, they
supposed that reality is confined to sensible things, in which the
nature of the Indeterminate, i.e. of Being in the sense which we have
explained,
28 is abundantly
present. (Thus their statements, though plausible, are not
true;this form of
the criticism is more suitable than that which Epicharmus
29 applied to
Xenophanes.) And further, observing that all this indeterminate
substance is in motion, and that no true predication can be made of
that which changes, they supposed that it is impossible to make any
true statement about that which is in all ways and entirely
changeable.For it
was from this supposition that there blossomed forth the most extreme
view of those which we have mentioned, that of the professed followers
of Heraclitus, and such as Cratylus held, who ended by thinking that
one need not say anything, and only moved his finger; and who
criticized Heraclitus for saying that one cannot enter the same river
twice,
30 for he himself
held that it cannot be done even once.
But we shall
reply to this theory also that although that which is changeable
supplies them, when it changes, with some real ground for supposing
that it "is not," yet there is something debatable in this; for that
which is shedding any quality retains something of that which is being
shed, and something of that which is coming to be must already
exist.
[20]
And in general if a thing is
ceasing to be, there will be something there which
is ;
and if a thing is coming to be, that from which it comes and by which
it is generated must
be ; and this cannot go on to
infinity. But let us leave this line of argument and remark that
quantitative and qualitative change are not the same.Let it be granted that there
is nothing permanent in respect of quantity; but it is by the
form that we recognize everything. And again those
who hold the theory that we are attacking deserve censure in that they
have maintained about the whole material universe what they have
observed in the case of a mere minority of sensible things.For it is only the realm of
sense around us which continues subject to destruction and generation,
but this is a practically negligible part of the whole; so that it
would have been fairer for them to acquit the former on the ground of
the latter than to condemn the latter on account of the
former.
Further, we shall
obviously say to these thinkers too the same as we said some time
ago
31; for we must prove to them and
convince them that there is a kind of nature that is not
moved(and yet those
who claim that things can at once be and not be are logically
compelled to admit rather that all things are at rest than that they
are in motion; for there is nothing for them to change into, since
everything exists in everything).
[
1010b]
[1]
And as concerning
reality, that not every appearance is real, we shall say, first, that
indeed the perception, at least of the proper object of a sense, is
not false, but the impression we get of it is not the same as the
perception.And then
we may fairly express surprise if our opponents raise the question
whether magnitudes and colors are really such as they appear at a
distance or close at hand, as they appear to the healthy or to the
diseased; and whether heavy things are as they appear to the weak or
to the strong; and whether truth is as it appears to the waking or to
the sleeping.For clearly
they do not really believe the latter alternative—at any
rate no one, if in the night he thinks that he is at
Athens whereas he is really in
Africa, starts off to
the Odeum.
32 And again concerning the
future (as indeed Plato says
33)
the opinion of the doctor and that of the layman are presumably not
equally reliable, e.g. as to whether a man will get well or
not.And again in
the case of the senses themselves, our perception of a foreign object
and of an object proper to a given sense, or of a kindred object and
of an actual object of that sense itself, is not equally reliable
34; but in the case of colors
sight, and not taste, is authoritative, and in the case of flavor
taste, and not sight. But not one of the senses ever asserts at the
same time of the same object that it is "so and not so."Nor even at another
time
[20]
does it make a
conflicting statement about the quality, but only about that to which
the quality belongs. I mean, e.g., that the same wine may seem, as the
result of its own change or of that of one's body, at one time sweet
and at another not; but sweetness, such as it is when it exists, has
never yet changed, and there is no mistake about it, and that which is
to be sweet is necessarily of such a nature.Yet all these theories destroy the possibility
of anything's existing by necessity, inasmuch as they destroy the
existence of its essence; for "the necessary" cannot be in one way and
in another; and so if anything exists of necessity, it cannot be "both
so and not so."
And in general, if only
the sensible exists, without animate things there would be nothing;
for there would be no sense-faculty.That there would be neither sensible qualities
nor sensations is probably true
35(for these depend upon an effect produced in the
percipient), but that the substrates which cause the sensation should
not exist even apart from the sensation is impossible.For sensation is not of
itself, but there is something else too besides the sensation, which
must be prior to the sensation;
[
1011a]
[1]
because that which
moves is by nature prior to that which is moved, and this is no less
true if the terms are correlative.
But there are
some, both of those who really hold these convictions and of those who
merely profess these views, who raise a difficulty; they inquire who
is to judge of the healthy man, and in general who is to judge rightly
in each particular case. But such questions are like wondering whether
we are at any given moment asleep or awake;and all problems of this kind amount to the
same thing. These people demand a reason for everything. They want a
starting-point, and want to grasp it by demonstration; while it is
obvious from their actions that they have no conviction. But their
case is just what we have stated before
36;
for they require a reason for things which have no reason, since the
starting-point of a demonstration is not a matter of
demonstration.The
first class, then, may be readily convinced of this, because it is not
hard to grasp. But those who look only for cogency in argument look
for an impossibility, for they claim the right to contradict
themselves, and lose no time in doing so.Yet if not everything is relative, but some
things are self-existent, not every appearance will be true; for an
appearance is an appearance to someone. And so he who says that
all
[20]
appearances are
true makes everything relative.Hence those who demand something cogent in
argument, and at the same time claim to make out a case, must guard
themselves by saying that the appearance is true; not in itself, but
for him to whom it appears, and at, the time when
it appears, and in the
way and
manner in which it
appears. And if they make out a case without this
qualification, as a result they will soon contradict
themselves;for it is
possible in the case of the same man for a thing to appear honey to
the sight, but not to the taste, and for things to appear different to
the sight of each of his two eyes, if their sight is unequal. For to
those who assert (for the reasons previously stated
37) that appearances are true, and that all things are therefore
equally false and true, because they do not appear the same to all,
nor always the same to the same person, but often have contrary
appearances at the same time(since if one crosses the fingers touch says that an object is two,
while sight says that it is only one
38), we shall say "but not to the
same sense or to the same part of it in the same way and at the same
time"; so that with this qualification the appearance will be true.
[
1011b]
[1]
But perhaps it is for this reason that
those who argue not from a sense of difficulty but for argument's sake
are compelled to say that the appearance is not true in itself, but
true to the percipient;and, as we have said before, are compelled also to make everything
relative and dependent upon opinion and sensation, so that nothing has
happened or will happen unless someone has first formed an opinion
about it; otherwise clearly all things would not be relative to
opinion.
Further, if a thing is
one, it is relative to one thing or to something determinate. And if
the same thing is both a half and an equal, yet the equal is not
relative to the double.If
to the thinking subject "man" and the object of thought are the same,
"man" will be not the thinking subject but the object of thought; and
if each thing is to be regarded as relative to the thinking subject,
the thinking subject will be relative to an infinity of specifically
different things.
That the most certain of all beliefs is
that opposite statements are not both true at the same time, and what
follows for those who maintain that they are true, and why these
thinkers maintain this, may be regarded as adequately stated. And
since the contradiction of a statement cannot be true at the same time
of the same thing, it is obvious that contraries cannot apply at the
same time to the same thing.For in each pair of contraries one is a
privation no less than it is a contrary—a privation of
substance. And privation is the negation of a predicate
[20]
to some defined genus. Therefore
if it is impossible at the same time to affirm and deny a thing truly,
it is also impossible for contraries to apply to a thing at the same
time; either both must apply in a modified sense, or one in a modified
sense and the other absolutely.
Nor indeed can
there be any intermediate between contrary statements, but of one
thing we must either assert or deny one thing, whatever it may be.
This will be plain if we first define truth and falsehood. To say that
what is is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what
is is, and what is not is not, is true; and therefore also he who says
that a thing is or is not will say either what is true or what is
false.But neither
what is nor what is not is said not to be
or to be.
Further, an intermediate between contraries will be intermediate
either as grey is between black and white, or as "neither man nor
horse" is between man and horse. If in the latter sense, it cannot
change (for change is from not-good to good, or from good to
not-good);but in
fact it is clearly always changing; for change can only be into the
opposite and the intermediate. And if it is a true intermediate, in
this case too there would be a kind of change into white not from
not-white; but in fact this is not seen.
39
[
1012a]
[1]
Further, the understanding either affirms or denies
every object of understanding or thought (as is clear from the
definition
40)whenever it is right or wrong. When, in asserting or denying, it
combines the predicates in one way, it is right; when in the other, it
is wrong.
Again, unless it is maintained
merely for argument's sake, the intermediate must exist beside all
contrary terms; so that one will say what is neither true nor false.
And it will exist beside what is and what is not; so that there will
be a form of change beside generation and destruction.
Again, there will also be an intermediate in all classes in which
the negation of a term implies the contrary assertion; e.g., among
numbers there will be a number which is neither odd nor not-odd. But
this is impossible, as is clear from the definition.
41Again, there will be an infinite progression, and
existing things will be not only half as many again, but even
more.For again it
will be possible to deny the intermediate in reference both to its
assertion and to its negation, and the result will be something
42;
for its essence is something distinct.
Again, when a man is asked whether a thing is white and says "no,"
he has denied nothing except that it is <white>, and its
not-being <white> is a negation.
Now
this view has occurred to certain people in just the same way as other
paradoxes have also occurred; for when they cannot find a way out from
eristic arguments, they submit to the argument and admit that the
conclusion is true.
[20]
Some,
then, hold the theory for this kind of reason, and others because they
require an explanation for everything. In dealing with all such
persons the starting-point is from definition;and definition results from the
necessity of their meaning something; because the formula, which their
term implies, will be a definition.
43 The doctrine of Heraclitus, which says that
everything is and is not,
44 seems to
make all things true; and that of Anaxagoras
45 seems to imply an intermediate in contradiction,
so that all things are false; for when things are mixed, the mixture
is neither good nor not-good; and so no statement is true.
It is obvious from this analysis that the one-sided and sweeping
statements which some people make cannot be substantially
true—some maintaining that nothing is true (for they say
that there is no reason why the same rule should not apply to
everything as applies to the commensurability of the diagonal of a
square
46), and some that
everything is true.These
theories are almost the same as that of Heraclitus. For the theory
which says that all things are true and all false also makes each of
these statements separately;
[
1012b]
[1]
so that if they are
impossible in combination they are also impossible individually. And
again obviously there are contrary statements, which cannot be true at
the same time. Nor can they all be false, although from what we have
said, this might seem more possible.But in opposing all such theories we must
demand, as was said in our discussion above,
47
not that something should be or not be, but some significant
statement; and so we must argue from a definition, having first
grasped what "falsehood" or "truth" means. And if to assert what is
true is nothing else than to deny what is false, everything cannot be
false; for one part of the contradiction must be true.Further, if everything must be
either asserted or denied, both parts cannot be false; for one and
only one part of the contradiction is false. Indeed, the consequence
follows which is notorious in the case of all such theories, that they
destroy themselves;for he
who says that everything is true makes the opposite theory true too,
and therefore his own untrue (for the opposite theory says that his is
not true); and he who says that everything is false makes himself a
liar.And if they
make exceptions, the one that the opposite theory alone is not true,
and the other that his own theory alone is not false,
[20]
it follows none the less that they
postulate an infinite number of true and false statements. For the
statement that the true statement is true is also true; and this will
go on to infinity.
Nor, as is obvious, are those right who
say that all things are at rest; nor those who say that all things are
in motion. For if all things are at rest, the same things will always
be true and false, whereas this state of affairs is obviously subject
to change; for the speaker himself once did not exist, and again he
will not exist. And if all things are in motion, nothing will be true,
so everything will be false; but this has been proved to be
impossible.Again, it
must be that which
is that changes, for change is from
something into something. And further, neither is it true that all
things are at rest or in motion sometimes, but nothing continuously;
for there is something
48 which always moves that which is
moved, and the "prime mover" is itself unmoved.
49