[
1028a]
[10]
The term "being" has several senses,
which we have classified in our discussion
1 of the number of senses in which terms are
used. It denotes first the "
what " of a thing, i.e. the
individuality; and then the quality or quantity or any other such
category. Now of all these senses which "being" has, the primary sense
is clearly the "what," which denotes the
substance
(because when we describe
the quality of a particular thing we say that it is "good or bad," and
not "five feet high" or "a man"; but when we describe
what it is, we say not that it is "white" or "hot" or
"five feet high," but that it is "a man" or "a god"), and all other
things are said to "be" because they are either quantities or
qualities or affections or some other such thing.
[20]
Hence one might
raise the question whether the terms "to walk" and "to be well" and
"to sit" signify each of these things as "being," or not; and
similarly in the case of any other such terms; for not one of them by
nature has an independent existence or can be separated from its
substance. Rather, if anything it is the
thing which
walks or sits or is well that is existent.The reason why these things are more truly
existent is because their subject is something definite; i.e. the
substance and the individual, which is clearly implied in a
designation of this kind, since apart from it we cannot speak of "the
good" or "sitting." Clearly then it is by reason of the substance that
each of the things referred to exists.Hence that which
is primarily,
not in a qualified sense but absolutely, will be substance.
Now "primary" has several meanings; but
nevertheless substance is primary in all senses, both in definition
and in knowledge and in time. For none of the other categories can
exist separately, but substance alone;and it is primary also in definition, because
in the formula of each thing the formula of substance must be
inherent; and we assume that we know each particular thing most truly
when we know
what "man" or "fire" is—
[
1028b]
[1]
rather than its quality or quantity or
position; because we know each of these points too when we know
what the quantity or quality is.Indeed, the question which was raised
long ago, is still and always will be, and which always baffles
us—"What is Being?"—is in other words "What is
substance?" Some say that it is one
2; others, more
than one; some, finite
3; others, infinite.
4 And so for us too our chief and primary and
practically our only concern is to investigate the nature of "being"
in the sense of substance.
Substance is thought to be
present most obviously in bodies. Hence we call animals and plants and
their parts substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water,
earth, etc., and all things which are parts of these or composed of
these, either of parts or them or of their totality; e.g. the visible
universe and its parts, the stars and moon and sun.We must consider whether (a) these are
the only substances, or (b) these and some others, or (c) some of
these, or (d) some of these and some others, or (e) none of these, but
certain others. Some
5 hold that the bounds of body—i.e.
the surface, line, point and unit—are substances, and in a
truer sense than body or the solid.Again, some
6 believe that there is
nothing of this kind besides sensible things, while others believe in
eternal entities more numerous and more real than sensible
things.
[20]
Thus Plato
posited the Forms and the objects of mathematics as two kinds of
substance, and as a third the substance of sensible bodies;and Speusippus
7 assumed still more kinds of
substances, starting with "the One," and positing principles for each
kind: one for numbers, another for magnitudes, and then another for
the soul. In this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. Some
8 again hold that the Forms and
numbers have the same nature, and that other things—lines
and planes—are dependent upon them; and soon back to the
substance of the visible universe and sensible things.We must consider, then, with
regard to these matters, which of the views expressed is right and
which wrong; and what things are substances; and whether there are any
substances besides the sensible substances, or not; and how sensible
substances exist; and whether there is any separable substance (and if
so, why and how) or no substance besides the sensible ones. We must
first give a rough sketch of what substance is.
The
term "substance" is used, if not in more, at least in four principal
cases; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are held
to be the substance of the particular, and fourthly the substrate. The
substrate is that of which the rest are predicated, while it is not
itself predicated of anything else. Hence we must first determine its
nature,
[
1029a]
[1]
for the primary substrate is considered
to be in the truest sense substance.
Now in one sense
we call the
matter the substrate; in another, the
shape ; and in a third, the combination of the two.
By matter I mean, for instance, bronze; by shape, the arrangement of
the form; and by the combination of the two, the concrete thing: the
statue. Thus if the form is prior to the matter and more truly
existent, by the same argument it will also be prior to the
combination.
We have now stated in outline the
nature of substance—that it is not that which is predicated
of a subject, but that of which the other things are predicated. But
we must not merely define it so, for it is not enough. Not only is the
statement itself obscure, but also it makes matter substance; for if
matter is not substance, it is beyond our power to say what else
is.For when
everything else is removed, clearly nothing but matter remains;
because all the other things are affections, products and potencies of
bodies, and length, breadth and depth are kinds of quantity, and not
substances. For quantity is not a substance; rather the substance is
that to which these affections primarily belong.But when we take away length and
breadth and depth we can see no thing remaining, unless it be the
something bounded by them; so that on this view matter must appear to
be the only substance.
[20]
By
matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor a
quantity nor designated by any of the categories which define
Being.For there is
something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is
different from that of each one of the categories; because all other
things are predicated of substance, but this is predicated of matter.
Thus the ultimate substrate is in itself neither a particular thing
nor a quantity nor anything else. Nor indeed is it the negations of
these; for the negations too will only apply to it
accidentally.
If we hold this view, it follows that
matter is substance. But this is impossible; for it is accepted that
separability and individuality belong especially to substance. Hence
it would seem that the form and the combination of form and matter are
more truly substance than matter is.The substance, then, which consists of
both—I mean of matter and form—may be dismissed,
since it is posterior and obvious. Matter too is in a sense evident.
We must consider the third type, for this is the most
perplexing.
Now it is agreed that
some sensible things are substances, and so we should begin our
inquiry in connection with these.
[
1029b]
[1]
It is convenient to advance to the more
intelligible
9; for learning is always acquired
in this way, by advancing through what is less intelligible by nature
to what is more so. And just as in actions it is our task to start
from the good of the individual and make absolute good good for the
individual,
10 so it is our
task to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make what
is by nature intelligible intelligible to oneself.Now that which is intelligible and
primary to individuals is often but slightly intelligible, and
contains but little reality; but nevertheless, starting from that
which is imperfectly intelligible but intelligible to oneself, we must
try to understand the absolutely intelligible; advancing, as we have
said, by means of these very things which are intelligible to
us.
Since we distinguished at the
beginning
11 the number of ways in
which substance is defined, and since one of these appeared to be
essence, we must investigate this.First, let us make certain linguistic
statements about it.
The essence of each
thing is that which it is said to be per se. "To be you" is not "to be
cultured," because you are not of your own nature cultured. Your
essence, then, is that which you are said to be
of your own nature. But not even all of this is the
essence; for the essence is not that which is said to be per se in the
sense that whiteness is said to belong to a surface,
12 because "being a surface" is not
"being white."Nor is the
essence the combination of both, "being a white surface." Why? Because
the word itself is repeated.
[20]
Hence the formula of the essence of each thing is that which defines
the term but does not contain it. Thus if "being a white surface" is
the same as "being a smooth surface," "white" and "smooth" are one and
the same.
13But since in the other
categories too there are compounds with substance (because there is a
substrate for each category, e.g. quality, quantity, time, place and
motion), we must inquire whether there is a formula of the essence of
each one of them; whether these compounds, e.g. "white man," also have
an essence. Let the compound be denoted by X.
14
What is the essence of X?
"But this is
not even a per se expression." We reply that there are two ways in
which a definition can be not per se true of its subject: (a) by an
addition, and (b) by an omission.In one case the definition is not per se true
because the term which is being defined is combined with something
else; as if, e.g., in defining whiteness one were to state the
definition of a white man. In the other, because something else (which
is not in the definition) is combined with the subject; as if, e.g., X
were to denote "white man," and X were defined as "white." "White man"
is white,
[
1030a]
[1]
but its essence is not "to be white."
But is "to be X" an essence at all?Surely not. The essence is an individual type;
but when a subject has something distinct from it predicated of it, it
is not an individual type. E.g., "white man" is not an individual
type; that is, assuming that individuality belongs only to substances.
Hence essence belongs to all things the account of which is a
definition.We have
a definition, not if the name and the account signify the same (for
then all accounts would be definitions; because any account can have a
name, so that even "the
Iliad " will be a definition),
but if the account is of something primary. Such are all statements
which do not involve the predication of one thing of
another.Hence
essence will belong to nothing except species of a genus, but to these
only; for in these the predicate is not considered to be related to
the subject by participation or affection, nor as an accident. But of
everything else as well, if it has a name, there will be a formula of
what it means—that X belongs to Y; or
instead of a simple formula one more exact—but no
definition, nor essence.
Or perhaps "definition," like
the "what," has more than one sense. For the "what" in one sense means
the substance and the individual,
[20]
and in another each one of the categories:
quantity, quality, etc.Just as "is" applies to everything, although not in the same way,
but primarily to one thing and secondarily to others; so "what it is"
applies in an unqualified sense to substance, and to other things in a
qualified sense. For we might ask also what quality "is," so that
quality also is a "what it is"; not however without qualification, but
just as in the case of not-being some say by a verbal quibble that
not-being "is"—not in an unqualified sense, but "is"
not-being—so too with quality.
Now although we
must also consider how we should express ourselves in each particular
case, it is still more important to consider what the facts are. Hence
now, since the language which we are using is clear, similarly essence
also will belong primarily and simply to substance, and secondarily to
other things as well; just as the "what it is" is not essence simply,
but the essence of a quality or quantity.For it must be either by equivocation that we
say that these things
are , or by adding and subtracting
qualifications, as we say that the unknowable is known
15;
since the truth is that we use the terms neither equivocally nor in
the same sense, but just as we use the term "medical" in
relation to one and the same thing;
[
1030b]
[1]
but not
of one and the same thing, nor
yet equivocally. The term "medical" is applied to a body and a
function and an instrument, neither equivocally nor in one sense, hut
in relation to one thing.
16However, in whichever way one chooses to speak of these things, it
matters nothing; but this point is clear: that the primary and
unqualified definition, and the essence, belong to substances. It is
true that they belong equally to other things too, but not
primarily . For if we assume this, it does not
necessarily follow that there is a definition of anything which means
the same as any formula; it must mean the same as a particular kind of
formula, i.e. the formula of one thing—one not by continuity like the
Iliad, or things which are arbitrarily combined,
but in one of the proper senses of "one." And "one" has the same
variety of senses as "being." "Being" means sometimes the individual
thing, sometimes the quantity, sometimes the quality. Hence even
"white man" will have a formula and definition; but in a different
sense from the definition of "whiteness" and "substance."
The question arises: If one denies that a formula involving an added
determinant is a definition, how can there be a definition of terms
which are not simple but coupled? Because they can only be explained
by adding a determinant.I
mean, e.g., there is "nose" and "concavity" and "snubness," the term
compounded of the two, because the one is present in the other.
Neither "concavity" nor "snubness" is an accidental, but a per se
affection of the nose.
17
[20]
Nor are they attributes in the sense that "white"
is of Callias or a man, because Callias is white and is by accident a
man; but in the sense that "male" is an attribute of animal, and
equality of quantity, and all other attributes which we say belong per
se.That is, all
things which involve the formula or name of the subject of the
affection, and cannot be explained apart from it. Thus "white" can be
explained apart from "man," but not "female" apart from "animal." Thus
either these terms have no essence or definition, or else they have it
in a different sense, as we have said.
But there is also
another difficulty about them. If "snub nose" is the same as "concave
nose," "snub" will be the same as "concave." But if not, since it is
impossible to speak of "snub" apart from the thing of which it is a
per se affection (because "snub" means a concavity in the nose),
either it is impossible to call the nose snub, or it will be a
tautology, "concave-nose nose" because "snub nose" will equal
"concave-nose nose."Hence
it is absurd that such terms as these should have an essence.
Otherwise there will be an infinite regression; for in "snub-nose
nose" there will be yet another nose.
[
1031a]
[1]
Clearly, then, there is definition of substance alone. If there were
definition of the other categories also, it would have to involve an
added determinant, as in the case of the qualitative; and of the odd,
for this cannot be defined apart from number; nor can "female" apart
from "animal."By
"involving an added determinant" I mean descriptions which involve a
tautology, as in the above examples. Now if this is true, there will
be no definition of compound expressions either; e.g., "odd number."
We fail to realize this because our terms are not used accurately. If
on the other hand there are definitions of these too, either they are
defined in a different way, or, as we have said, "definition" and
"essence" must be used in more than one sense;thus in one sense there will be no
definition of anything, and nothing will have an essence, except
substances; and in another those other things will have a definition
and essence. It is obvious, then, that the definition is the formula
of the essence, and that the essence belongs either
only
to substances, or especially and primarily and simply.
We must inquire whether the essence is the same as the particular
thing, or different. This is useful for our inquiry about substance;
because a particular thing is considered to be nothing other than its
own substance, and the essence is called the substance of the
thing.In accidental
predications, indeed, the thing itself would seem to be different from
its essence;
[20]
e.g., "white
man" is different from "essence of white man." If it were the same,
"essence of man" and "essence of white man" would be the same. For
"man" and "white man" are the same, they say, and therefore "essence
of white man" is the same as "essence of man."But perhaps it is not necessarily true
that the essence of accidental combinations is the same as that of the
simple terms; because the extremes of the syllogism are not identical
with the middle term in the same way.
18 Perhaps it might be thought to follow that
the accidental extremes are identical; e.g. "essence of white" and
"essence of cultured"; but this is not admitted.
19But in
per se expressions, is the thing necessarily the same as its essence,
e.g., if there are substances which have no other substances or
entities prior to them, such as some hold the Ideas to be?For if the Ideal Good is to be
different from the essence of good, and the Ideal Animal and Being
from the essence of animal and being,
[
1031b]
[1]
there
will be other substances and entities and Ideas besides the ones which
they describe; and prior to them, if essence is substance. And if they
are separate from each other, there will be no knowledge of the Ideas,
and the essences will not exist(by "being separate" I mean if neither the
essence of good is present in the Ideal Good, nor "being good" in the
essence of good); for it is when we know the essence of it that we
have knowledge of a thing. And it is the same with other essences as
with the essence of good; so that if the essence of good is not good,
neither will the essence of being "be," nor the essence of one be
one.Either all
essences exist alike, or none of them; and so if not even the essence
of being "is," neither will any other essence exist. Again that to
which "essentially good" does not apply cannot be good. Hence "the
good" must be one with the essence of good, "the beautiful" with the
essence of beauty, and so with all terms which are not dependent upon
something else, but self-subsistent and primary.
20For it is enough if this is so, even if they
are not Forms; or perhaps rather even if they are. (At the same time
it is clear also that if the Ideas are such as some hold, the
substrate will not be substance; for the Ideas must be substances, but
not involving a substrate, because if they did involve one they would
exist in virtue of its participation in them.)
21That each individual thing is
one and the same with its essence, and not merely accidentally
so,
[20]
is apparent, not
only from the foregoing considerations, but because to have knowledge
of the individual is to have knowledge of its essence; so that by
setting out examples it is evident that both must be
identical.But as
for the accidental term, e.g. "cultured" or "white," since it has two
meanings, it is not true to say that the term itself is the same as
its essence; for both the accidental term and that of which it is an
accident are "white," so that in one sense the essence and the term
itself are the same, and in another they are not, because the essence
is not the same as "the man" or "the white man," but it is the same as
the affection.
The absurdity <of separating a
thing from its essence> will be apparent also if one supplies a
name for each essence; for then there will be another essence besides
the original one, e.g. the essence of "horse" will have a further
essence. Yet why should not some things be identified with their
essence from the outset,
22
if essence is substance? Indeed not only are the thing and its essence
one, but their formula is the same,
[
1032a]
[1]
as is
clear from what we have just stated; for it is not by accident that
the essence of "one," and "the one," are one.Moreover, if they are different, there
will be an infinite series; for the essence of "one" and "the one"
will both exist; so that in that case too the same principle will
apply.
23 Clearly, then, in the case of
primary and self-subsistent terms, the individual thing and its
essence are one and the same.
It is obvious that the
sophistical objections to this thesis are met in the same way as the
question whether Socrates is
the same as the essence of
Socrates; for there is no difference either in the
grounds for asking the question or in the means of meeting it
successfully. We have now explained in what sense the essence is, and
in what sense it is not, the same as the individual thing.
Of things which are generated, some are generated naturally, others
artificially, and others spontaneously; but everything which is
generated is generated by something and from something and becomes
something. When I say "becomes something" I mean in any of the
categories; it may come to be either a particular thing or of some
quantity or quality or in some place.
Natural generation is the generation of things whose generation is
by nature.That from which
they are generated is what we call matter; that by which, is something
which exists naturally; and that which they become is a man or a plant
or something else of this kind, which we call substance in the highest
degree.
[20]
All things
which are generated naturally or artificially have matter; for it is
possible for each one of them both to be and not to be, and this
possibility is the matter in each individual thing.And in general both that from which and
that in accordance with which they are generated, is nature; for the
thing generated, e.g. plant or animal, has a nature. And that by which
they are generated is the so-called "formal" nature, which has the
same form as the thing generated (although it is in something else);
for man begets man.
Such is the
generation of things which are naturally generated; the other kinds of
generation are called productions. All productions proceed from either
art or potency or thought.Some of them are also generated spontaneously and by chance in much
the same way as things which are naturally generated; for sometimes
even in the sphere of nature the same things are generated both from
seed and without it.
24
We shall consider cases of this kind later.
25
[
1032b]
[1]
Things are generated artificially whose form is
contained in the soul (by "form" I mean the essence of each thing, and
its primary substance);for
even contraries have in a sense the same form.
26 For the substance of the
privation is the opposite substance; e.g., health is the substance of
disease; for disease is the absence of health, and health is the
formula and knowledge in the soul. Now the healthy subject is produced
as the result of this reasoning: since health is so-and-so, if the
subject is to be healthy, it must have such-and-such a quality, e.g.
homogeneity; and if so, it must have heat.And the physician continues reasoning until he
arrives at what he himself finally can do; then the process from this
point onwards, i.e. the process towards health, is called
"production." Therefore it follows in a sense that health comes from
health and a house from a house; that which has matter from that which
has not (for the art of medicine or of building is the
form of health or the house). By substance without matter
I mean the essence.
In generations and motions part of the
process is called cogitation, and part production—that which
proceeds from the starting-point and the form is cogitation, and that
which proceeds from the conclusion of the cogitation is production.
Each of the other intermediate measures is carried out in the same
way. I mean, e.g., that if A is to be healthy, his physical condition
will have to be made uniform. What, then, does being made uniform
entail? So-and-so;
[20]
and this
will be achieved if he is made hot. What does this entail? So-and-so;
now this is potentially present, and the thing is now in his
power.
The thing which produces, and from which the
process of recovering health begins, is the form in the soul, if the
process is artificial; if spontaneous, it is whatever is the
starting-point of the production for the artificial producer; as in
medical treatment the starting-point is, perhaps, the heating of the
patient; and this the doctor produces by friction. Heat in the body,
then, is either a part of health, or is followed (directly or through
several intermediaries) by something similar which is a part of
health. This is the ultimate thing, namely that produces, and in this
sense is a part of, health—or of the house (in the form of stones)
27 or of other things. Therefore, as we say,
generation would be impossible if nothing were already existent. It is
clear, then, that some part must necessarily pre-exist; because the
matter is a part, since it is matter which pre-exists in the product
and becomes something.
[
1033a]
[1]
But then is matter part of the
formula? Well, we define bronze circles in both ways; we describe the
matter as bronze, and the form as such-and-such a shape; and this
shape is the proximate genus in which the circle is placed.The bronze circle, then, has
its matter in its formula. Now as for that from which, as matter,
things are generated, some things when they are generated are called
not "so-and-so," but "made of so-and-so"; e.g., a statue is not called
stone, but made of stone. But the man who becomes healthy is not
called after that from which he becomes healthy. This is because the
generation proceeds from the privation and the substrate, which we
call matter (e.g., both "the man" and "the invalid" become
healthy),but it is
more properly said to proceed from the privation; e.g., a man becomes
healthy from being an invalid rather than from being a man. Hence a
healthy person is not called an invalid, but a man, and a healthy man.
But where the privation is obscure and has no name—e.g. in
bronze the privation of any given shape, or in bricks and wood the
privation of the shape of a house—the generation is
considered to proceed from these materials, as in the former case from
the invalid.Hence just as
in the former case the subject is not called that from which it is
generated, so in this case the statue is not called wood, but is
called by a verbal change not wood, but wooden; not bronze, but made
of bronze; not stone, but made of stone; and the house is called not
bricks, but made of bricks.
[20]
For if we consider the matter carefully, we should not even say
without qualification that a statue is generated from wood, or a house
from bricks; because that from which a thing is generated should not
persist, but be changed. This, then, is why we speak in this
way.
Now since that which is generated is generated
by something (by which I mean the starting-point of
the process of generation), and
from something (by which
let us understand not the privation but the matter; for we have
already distinguished the meanings of these), and
becomes
something (i.e. a sphere or circle or whatever else it may be); just
as the craftsman does not produce the substrate, i.e. the bronze, so
neither does he produce the sphere; except accidentally, inasmuch as
the bronze sphere is a sphere, and he makes the former.For to make an individual thing
is to make it out of the substrate in the fullest sense. I mean that
to make the bronze round is not to make the round or the sphere, but
something else; i.e. to produce this form in another medium. For if we
make the form, we must make it out of something else; for this has
been assumed.
[
1033b]
[1]
E.g., we make a bronze sphere; we do
this in the sense that from A, i.e. bronze, we make B, i.e. a
sphere.If, then, we
make the spherical form itself, clearly we shall have to make it in
the same way; and the processes of generation will continue to
infinity.
It is therefore obvious
that the form (or whatever we should call the shape in the sensible
thing) is not generated—generation does not apply to
it— nor is the essence generated; for this is that which is
induced in something else either by art or by nature or by
potency.But we do
cause a bronze sphere to be, for we produce it from bronze and a
sphere; we induce the form into this particular matter, and the result
is a bronze sphere. But if the essence of sphere in general is
generated, something must be generated from something; for that which
is generated will always have to be divisible, and be partly one thing
and partly another; I mean partly matter and partly form.If then a sphere is the figure
whose circumference is everywhere equidistant from the center, part of
this will be the medium in which that which we produce will be
contained, and part will be in that medium; and the whole will be the
thing generated, as in the case of the bronze sphere. It is obvious,
then, from what we have said, that the thing in the sense of form or
essence is not generated, whereas the concrete whole which is called
after it is generated; and that in everything that is generated matter
is present, and one part is matter and the other form.
[20]
Is there then some
sphere besides the particular spheres, or some house besides the
bricks? Surely no individual thing would ever have been generated if
form had existed thus independently.
28 Form means "of such a kind"; it is not a
definite individual, but we produce or generate from the individual
something "of such a kind"; and when it is generated it is an
individual "of such a kind."The whole individual, Callias or
Socrates, corresponds to "this bronze sphere," but
"man" and "animal" correspond to bronze sphere in general.
Obviously therefore the cause which consists
of the Forms (in the sense in which some speak of them, assuming that
there are certain entities besides particulars), in respect at least
of generation and destruction, is useless; nor, for this reason at any
rate, should they be regarded as self-subsistent substances.Indeed in some cases it is even
obvious that that which generates is of the same kind as that which is
generated—not however identical with it, nor numerically one
with it, but formally one—e.g. in natural productions (for
man begets man), unless something happens contrary to nature, as when
a horse sires a mule. And even these cases are similar; for that which
would be common to both horse and ass, the genus immediately above
them, has no name; but it would probably be both, just as the mule is
both.
29
[
1034a]
[1]
Thus obviously there is no need to set
up a form as a pattern (for we should have looked for Forms in these
cases especially, since living things are in a special sense
substances); the thing which generates is sufficient to produce, and
to be the cause of the form in the matter. The completed whole,
such-and-such a form induced in this flesh and these bones, is Callias
or Socrates. And it is
different from that which generated it, because the matter is
different but identical in form, because the form is
indivisible.
The question might be raised why some
things are generated both artificially and
spontaneously—e.g. health—and others not; e.g. a
house. The reason is that in some cases the matter—which is
the starting-point of the process in the production and generation of
artificial things, and in which some part of the result is already
existent—is such that it can initiate its own motion, and in
other cases it is not; and of the former kind some can initiate motion
in a particular way, and some cannot. For many things can move
themselves, but not in a particular way, e.g. so as to
dance.It is
impossible, then, for any things whose matter is of this kind (e.g.
stones) to be moved in
this particular way except by
something else; but in
that particular way it is
possible. And it is so with fire.
30 For this reason some things cannot exist
apart from the possessor of the art, and others can;
[20]
because the motion can be initiated by
those things which do not indeed possess the art, but can themselves
be moved either by other things which do not possess the art, or by
the motion from the part of the product which pre-exists in them.
31It is clear also from what we have said
that in a sense all artificial things are generated either from
something which bears the same name (as is the case with natural
objects) or from a part of themselves which bears the same name as
themselves (e.g. a house from a house, inasmuch as it is generated by
mind; for the art is the form), or from something which contains some
part; that is if the generation is not accidental; for the direct and
independent cause of the production is a part of the
product.Heat in the
motion produces heat in the body; and either this is health or a part
of health, or a part of health or health accompanies it. And this is
why heat is said to produce health, because it produces that of which
health is a concomitant and consequence. Therefore as essence is the
starting-point of everything in syllogisms (because syllogisms start
from the "what" of a thing), so too generation proceeds from
it.
And it is the same with natural formations as
it is with the products of art. For the seed produces just as do those
things which function by art. It contains the form potentially,
[
1034b]
[1]
and that from which the seed comes has
in some sense the same name as the product (for we must not expect
that all should have the same name in the sense that "man" is produced
by "man"—since woman is also produced by man); unless the
product is a freak. This is why a mule is not produced by a
mule.
Those natural objects which are produced, like
artificial objects, spontaneously, are those whose matter can also
initiate for itself that motion which the seed initiates. Those whose
matter cannot do this cannot be generated otherwise than by their
proper parents.
It is not only with
reference to substance that our argument shows that the form is not
generated; the same argument is common in its application to all the
primary divisions, i.e. quantity, quality and the other
categories.For just
as the bronze sphere is generated, but not the sphere nor the bronze;
and as in the case of bronze, if it is generated the form and matter
are not (because they must always pre-exist), so it is too with the
"what" and the quality and quantity and the other categories
similarly; for it is not the quality that is generated, but the wood
of that quality; nor is it the size, but the wood or animal of that
size.But a
peculiarity of substance may be gathered from this: that some other
substance must pre-exist in actuality which produces it; e.g. an
animal, if an animal is being generated; but a quality or quantity
need not pre-exist otherwise than potentially.
[20]
Since a
definition is a formula, and every formula has parts; and since the
formula is related to the thing in the same way as the part of the
formula to the part of the thing, the question
32 now
arises: Must the formula of the parts be contained in the formula of
the whole, or not? It seems clear that it is so in some cases, but not
in others.The formula of
the circle does not include that of the segments, but the formula of
the syllable includes that of the letters. And yet the circle is
divisible into its segments in just the same way as the syllable into
its letters.
Again, if the parts are
prior to the whole, and the acute angle is part of the right angle,
and the finger part of the animal, the acute angle will be prior to
the right angle, and the finger to the man.But it is considered that the latter are
prior; for in the formula the parts are explained from them; and the
wholes are prior also in virtue of their ability to exist
independently. The truth probably is that "part" has several meanings,
one of which is "that which measures in respect of quantity." However,
let us dismiss this question and consider of what, in the sense of
parts, substance consists.
[
1035a]
[1]
If
then matter, form, and the combination of the two are distinct, and if
both matter and form and their combination are substance, there is one
sense in which even matter may be called "part" of a thing; and
another in which it is not, but the only parts are those elements of
which the formula of the form consists. E.g., flesh is not a part of
concavity, because flesh is the matter in which concavity is induced;
but it is a part of snubness. And bronze is part of the statue as a
concrete whole, but not of the statue in the sense of form.We may speak of the form (or
the thing as having a form) as an individual thing, but we may never
so speak of that which is material by itself. This is why the formula
of the circle does not contain that of the segments, whereas the
formula of the syllable does contain that of the letters; for the
letters are parts of the formula of the form; they are not matter; but
the segments are parts in the sense of matter in which the form is
induced. They approximate, however, more closely to the form than does
the bronze when roundness is engendered in bronze.But there is a sense in which not even
all the letters will be contained in the formula of the syllable; e.g.
particular letters on wax
33 or sounds in the air; for
these too are part of the syllable in the sense that they are its
sensible matter.For even
if the line is divided and resolved into its halves, or if the man is
resolved into bones and muscles and flesh,
[20]
it does not follow that they are
composed of these as parts of their essence, but as their matter; and
these are parts of the concrete whole, but not of the form, or that to
which the formula refers. Hence they are not in the
formulae.Accordingly in some cases the formula will include the formula of
such parts as the above, but in others it need not necessarily contain
their formula, unless it is the formula of the concrete object. It is
for this reason that some things are composed of parts in the sense of
principles into which they can be resolved, while others are
not.All things
which are concrete combinations of form and matter (e.g. "the snub" or
the bronze circle) can be resolved into form and matter, and the
matter is a part of them; but such as are not concrete combinations
with matter, but are without matter—whose formulae refer to
the form only—cannot be resolved; either not at all, or at
least not in this way.Thus these material components are principles and parts of the
concrete objects, but they are neither parts nor principles of the
form. For this reason the clay statue can be resolved into clay, and
the sphere into bronze, and Callias into flesh and bones, and the
circle too into segments, because it is something which is combined
with matter.
[
1035b]
[1]
For we use the same name for the
absolute circle and for the particular circle, since there is no
special name for the particular circles.
We have now
stated the truth; nevertheless let us recapitulate and state it more
clearly. All constituents which are parts of the formula, and into
which the formula can be divided, are prior to their
wholes—either all or some of them. But the formula of the
right angle is not divisible into the formula of an acute angle, but
vice versa; since in defining the acute angle we use the right angle,
because "the acute angle is less than a right angle."It is the same with the
circle and the semicircle; for the semicircle is defined by means of
the circle. And the finger is defined by means of the whole body; for
a finger is a particular kind of part of a man. Thus such parts as are
material, and into which the whole is resolved as into matter, are
posterior to the whole; but such as are parts in the sense of parts of
the formula and of the essence as expressed in the formula, are prior;
either all or some of them.And since the soul of animals (which is the
substance of the living creature) is their substance in accordance
with the formula, and the form and essence of that particular kind of
body (at least each part, if it is to be properly defined, will not be
defined apart from its function; and this will not belong to it apart
from perception
34); therefore the parts of the soul are prior, either
all or some of them, to the concrete animal; and similarly in other
individual cases.
[20]
But the body and its parts
are posterior to this substance, and it is not the substance, but the
concrete whole, which is resolved into these parts as into matter.
Therefore in one sense these parts are prior to the concrete whole,
and in another not; for they cannot exist in separation. A finger
cannot in every state be a part of a living animal; for the dead
finger has only the name in common with the living one.Some parts are contemporary
with the whole: such as are indispensable and in which the formula and
the essence are primarily present; e.g. the heart or perhaps the
brain,
35 for it does not matter
which of them is of this nature. But "man" and "horse" and terms which
are applied in this way to individuals, but universally, are not
substance, but a kind of concrete whole composed of
this
particular formula and
this particular matter regarded as
universal. But individually
Socrates is already composed of ultimate matter; and
similarly in all other cases.
A part, then, may be part of
the form (by form I mean essence), or of the concrete whole composed
of form and matter, or of the matter itself. But only the parts of the
form are parts of the formula, and the formula refers to the
universal;
[
1036a]
[1]
for "circle" is the same as "essence of
circle," and "soul" the same as "essence of soul."But when we come to the concrete thing,
e.g. this circle—which is a particular individual, either
sensible or intelligible (by intelligible circles I mean those of
mathematics,
36 and by sensible those which are of bronze
or wood)—of these individuals there is no
definition;we
apprehend them by intelligence or perception; and when they have
passed from the sphere of actuality it is uncertain whether they exist
or not, but they are always spoken of and apprehended by the universal
formula. But the matter is in itself unknowable. Some matter is
sensible and some intelligible; sensible, such as bronze and wood and
all movable matter; intelligible, that which is present in sensible
things not qua sensible, e.g. the objects of
mathematics.
37We have now discussed the case of the whole and part, and of prior
and posterior. But we must answer the question, when we are asked
which is prior—the right angle and circle and animal, or
that into which they are resolved and of which they are composed, i.e.
their parts—by saying that neither is
absolutely prior.For if the soul also
is the
animal or living thing, or the soul of the individual
is
the individual, and "being a circle"
is the circle, and
"being a right angle" or the essence of the right angle
is the right angle, then we must admit that the whole in
one sense is posterior to the part in one sense:
[20]
e.g. to the parts in the formula and
the parts of a particular right angle(since both the material right angle of bronze
and the right angle included by individual lines are posterior to
their parts), but the immaterial angle is posterior to the parts in
the formula, but prior to the parts in the individual. We must not
give an unqualified answer. And if the soul is not the animal but
something else, even so we must say that some wholes are prior and
some are not, as has been stated.
The question
naturally presents itself, what sort of parts belong to the form and
what sort belong not to it but to the concrete object. Yet if this is
not plain it is impossible to define the particular; because the
definition refers to the universal and the form. Therefore if it is
not clear what kind of parts are material and what kind are not, the
formula of the thing will not be clear either.In the case of things which can be seen
to be induced in specifically different materials, as, e.g., a circle
is in bronze and stone and wood, it seems clear that these things, the
bronze and the stone, are in no sense part of the essential substance
of the circle, because it is separable from them.As for things which are not visibly
separable, there is no reason why the same should not apply to them;
e.g., if all the circles that had ever been seen were bronze;
[
1036b]
[1]
for the bronze would be none the less
no part of the form, but it is difficult to separate it in
thought.For
example, the form of "man" is always manifested in flesh and bones and
elements of this kind; then are these actually parts of the form and
formula, or are they not so, but matter, though since the form is not
induced in other materials, we cannot separate it?Now since this seems to be possible,
but it is not clear
when, some thinkers
38 are
doubtful even in the case of the circle and the triangle, considering
that it is not proper to define them by lines and continuous space,
but that all these are to the circle or triangle as flesh or bone is
to man, and bronze or stone to the statue; and they reduce everything
to numbers, and say that the formula of "line" is the formula of
2.And of the
exponents of the Forms, some make 2 the Ideal line, and some the form
of the line
39;
for they say that in some cases the form and that of which it is the
form, e.g. 2 and the form of 2, are the same; but in the case of
"line" this is no longer so.It follows, then, that there is one form of
many things whose form is clearly different (a consequence which
confronted the Pythagoreans too
40), and that
it is possible to make one supreme Form of everything, and not to
regard the rest as forms.
[20]
In
this way, however, all things would be one.
Now we
have stated that the question of definitions involves some difficulty,
and have shown why this is so. Hence to reduce everything in this way
and to dispose of the matter is going too far; for some things are
presumably a particular form in particular matter, or particular
things in a particular state.And the analogy in the case of the living
thing which the younger
Socrates
41 used to state is not a good one; for it
leads one away from the truth, and makes one suppose that it is
possible for a man to exist without his parts, as a circle does
without the bronze. But the case is not similar; for the animal is
sensible and cannot be defined without motion, and hence not unless
its parts are in some definite condition;for it is not the hand in
any
condition that is a part of a man, but only when it can perform its
function, and so has life in it. Without life in it it is not a
part.
And with respect to
mathematical objects, why are the formulae of the parts not parts of
the formulae of the whole; e.g., why are the formulae of the
semicircles not parts of the formula of the circle? for they are not
sensible.Probably
this makes no difference; because there will be matter even of some
things which are not sensible.
[
1037a]
[1]
Indeed there will be
matter in some sense in everything which is not essence or form
considered independently, but a particular thing. Thus the semicircles
will be parts not of the universal circle but of the particular
circles, as we said before
42—for
some matter is sensible, and some intelligible.It is clear also that the soul is the
primary substance, and the body matter; and "man" or "animal" is the
combination of both taken universally. And "
Socrates" or "Coriscus" has a
double sense, that is if the soul too can be called
Socrates (for by
Socrates some mean the soul and
some the concrete person); but if
Socrates means simply
this soul and
this body, the individual is composed similarly to
the universal.
Whether there is some other material
component of these substances besides their matter, and whether we
should look for some further substance in them, such as numbers or
something of that kind, must be considered later.
43 It
is with a view to this that we are trying to determine the nature of
sensible substances, since in a sense the study of sensible substances
belongs to physics or secondary philosophy; for the physicist must
know not only about the matter, but also about the substance according
to the formula; this is even more essential.And in the case of definitions, in what
sense the elements in the formula are parts of the definition, and why
the definition is one formula (for the thing is clearly one,
[20]
but in virtue of what is it one,
seeing that it has parts?); this must be considered later.
44We
have stated, then, in a general account which covers all cases, what
essence is, and how it is independent; and why the formula of the
essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, while
that of others does not; and we have shown that the material parts of
a thing cannot be present in the formula of the substance (since they
are not even parts of the substance in that sense, but of the concrete
substance; and of this in one sense there is a formula, and in another
sense there is not.There
is no formula involving the matter, for this is indeterminate; but
there is a formula in accordance with the primary substance, e.g., in
the case of a man, the formula of the soul; because the substance is
the indwelling form, of which and of the matter the so called concrete
substance is composed. E.g., concavity is such a form, since from this
and "nose" is derived "snub nose" and "snubness"—for "nose"
will be present twice over in these expressions);but in the concrete substance, e.g.
snub nose or Callias, matter will be present too.
45 We
have stated also that the essence and the individual are in some cases
the same,
[
1037b]
[1]
as in the case of the primary
substances; e.g. crookedness and "essence of crookedness," if this is
primary.By primary
I mean that which does not imply the presence of something in
something else as a material substrate. But such things as are
material or are compounded with matter are not the same as their
essence; not even if they are accidentally one, e.g.
Socrates and "cultured"; for these
are only accidentally the same.
Now let us first
deal with definition, in so far as it has not been dealt with in the
Analytics; for the problem stated there
46 has a bearing upon our
discussion of substance. The problem I mean is this: what constitutes
the unity of the thing of which we say that the formula is a
definition? E.g., in the case of man, "two-footed animal"; for let us
take this as the formula of "man."Why, then, is this a unity and not a
plurality, "animal" and "two-footed"? For in the case of "man" and
"white" we have a plurality when the latter does not refer to the
former, but a unity when it does refer to it, and the subject, "man,"
has an attribute; for then they become a unity and we have "the white
man."But in the
case before us one term does not partake of the other; the genus is
not considered to partake of its differentiae, for then the same thing
would be partaking simultaneously of contraries,
[20]
since the differentiae by which the
genus is distinguished are contrary. And even if it does partake of
them, the same argument applies, since the differentiae are many; e.g.
terrestrial, two-footed, wingless.Why is it that these are a unity and not a
plurality? Not because they are present in one genus, for in that case
all the differentiae of the genus will form a unity. But all the
elements in the definition must form a unity, because the definition
is a kind of formula which is one and defines substance, so that it
must be a formula of one particular thing; because the substance
denotes one thing and an individual, as we say.
We must first
47 examine
definitions which are reached by the process of division.For there is nothing else in
the definition but the primary genus and the differentiae; the other
genera consist of the primary genus together with the differentiae
which are taken with it. E.g., the primary genus is "animal"; the next
below it, "two-footed animal"; and again, "two-footed wingless
animal"; and similarly also if the expression contains more terms
still.
[
1038a]
[1]
In general it does not matter whether it
contains many or few terms, nor, therefore, whether it contains few or
two. Of the two one is differentia and the other genus; e.g., in
"two-footed animal" "animal" is genus, and the other term
differentia.If,
then, the genus absolutely does not exist apart from the species which
it includes, or if it exists, but only as matter (for speech is genus
and matter, and the differentiae make the species, i.e. the letters,
out of it), obviously the definition is the formula composed of the
differentiae.
But further we must also divide by the
differentia of the differentia. E.g., "having feet" is a differentia
of "animal"; then in turn we must discover the differentia of "animal
having feet" qua "having feet." Accordingly we
should not say that of "that which has feet" one kind is winged and
another wingless, (that is if we are to speak correctly; if we say
this it will be through incapability), but only that one kind is
cloven-footed and another not; because these are differentiae of
"foot," since cloven-footedness is a kind of footedness.And thus we tend always to
progress until we come to the species which contain no differentiae.
At this point there will be just as many species of foot as there are
differentiae, and the kinds of animals having feet will be equal in
number to the differentiae. Then, if this is so,
[20]
obviously the ultimate differentia will
be the substance and definition of the thing, since we need not state
the same things more than once in definitions, because this is
superfluous.However, it does happen; for when we say "footed two-footed animal"
we have simply said "animal having feet, having two feet." And if we
divide this by its proper division, we shall be stating the same thing
several times, as many times as there are differentiae.
If, then, we keep on taking a differentia of a differentia, one of
them, the last, will be the form and the substance. But if we proceed
with reference to accidental qualities—e.g. if we divide
"that which has feet" into white and black—there will be as
many differentiae as there are divisions. It is therefore obvious that
the definition is the formula derived from the differentiae, and
strictly speaking from the last of them.This will be clear if we change the order of
such definitions, e.g. that of man, saying "two-footed footed animal";
for "footed" is superfluous when we have already said "two-footed."
But there is no question of order in the substance; for how are we to
think of one part as posterior and the other prior?
With regard, then, to definitions by division, let
this suffice as a preliminary statement of their nature.
[
1038b]
[1]
Since the subject of our inquiry is
substance, let us return to it. Just as the substrate and the essence
and the combination of these are called substance, so too is the
universal. With two of these we have already dealt, i.e. with the
essence
48 and the substrate
49; of the latter we have said that it
underlies in two senses—either being an individual thing (as
the animal underlies its attributes), or as matter underlies the
actuality.The
universal also is thought by some
50 to be in the truest sense
a cause and a principle. Let us therefore proceed to discuss this
question too; for it seems impossible that any universal term can be
substance.
First, the substance of
an individual is the substance which is peculiar to it and belongs to
nothing else; whereas the universal is common; for by universal we
mean that which by nature appertains to several things.Of what particular, then, will
the universal be the substance? Either of all or of none. But it
cannot be the substance of all; while, if it is to be the substance of
one, the rest also will be that one; because things whose substance is
one have also one essence and are themselves one.
Again, substance means that which is not predicated
of a subject, whereas the universal is always predicated of some
subject.
But perhaps although the
universal cannot be substance in the sense that essence is, it can be
present in the essence, as "animal" can be present in "man" and
"horse."Then
clearly there is in some sense a formula of the universal. It makes no
difference
[20]
even if
there is not a formula of everything that is in the substance; for the
universal will be none the less the substance of something; e.g.,
"man" will be the substance of the man in whom it is present. Thus the
same thing will happen again
51; e.g. "animal" will be the substance of that in which it
is present as peculiar to it.
Again, it is impossible and
absurd that the individual or substance, if it is composed of
anything, should be composed not of substances nor of the individual,
but of a quality; for then non-substance or quality will be prior to
substance or the individual. Which is impossible; for neither in
formula nor in time nor in generation can the affections of substance
be prior to the substance, since then they would be
separable.
Again, a substance will be present in
"Socrates," who is a
substance; so that it will be the substance of two things. And in
general it follows that if "man" and all terms used in this way are
substance, none of the elements in the formula is the substance of
anything, nor can it exist apart from the species or in anything else;
I mean, e.g., that neither "animal" nor any other element of the
formula can exist apart from the particular species.
If we
look at the question from this standpoint it is obvious that no
universal attribute is substance; and it is also clear from the fact
that none of the common predicates means "so-and-so,"
[
1039a]
[1]
but "such and-such." Otherwise amongst many other
awkward consequences we have the "third man."
52Again, it is clear in this way
too. Substance can not consist of substances actually present in it;
for that which is actually two can never be actually one, whereas if
it is potentially two it can be one. E.g., the double consists of two
halves—that is, potentially; for the actualization separates
the halves.Thus if
substance is one, it cannot consist of substances present in it even
in this sense, as Democritus rightly observes; he says that it is
impossible for two to come from one, or one from two, because he
identifies substance with the atoms.
53Clearly then the same will also hold good in the case of number
(assuming that number is a composition of units, as it is said to be
by some); because either 2 is not 1, or there is not
actually a unit in it.
The consequence
involves a difficulty; for if no substance can consist of universals,
because they mean "of such a kind," and not a particular thing; and if
no substance can be actually composed of substances, every substance
will be incomposite, and so there will be no formula of any
substance.But in
point of fact it is universally held, and has been previously
stated,
54
[20]
that substance is the only or chief
subject of definition; but on this showing there is no definition even
of substance. Then there can be no definition of anything; or rather
in a sense there can, and in a sense cannot. What this means will be
clearer from what follows later.
55From these same considerations
it is clear also what consequence follows for those who maintain that
the Forms are substances and separable, and who at the same time make
the species consist of the genus and the differentiae. If there are
Forms, and if "animal" is present in the man and the horse, it is
either numerically one and the same with them, or not.(In formula they are clearly
one; for in each case the speaker will enunciate the same formula.)
If, then, there is in some sense an Absolute Man, who is an individual
and exists separately, then the constituents, e.g. "animal" and
"two-footed," must have an individual meaning and be separable and
substances. Hence there must be an Absolute Animal too.
(i) Then if the "animal" which is in the horse and the man is one
and the same, as you are one and the same with yourself,
[
1039b]
[1]
how can the one which in things that exist
separately be one, and why should not this "animal" also be separated
from itself? Again, if it is to partake of "two-footed" and of
"many-footed," an impossibility follows; for contrary attributes will
belong to it although it is one and individual.But if it does not, in what sense is it
that one calls an animal "two-footed" or "terrestrial"? Perhaps the
terms are "combined" and "in contact" or "mixed." But all these
expressions are absurd.
(2) "But there
is a different 'animal' in each species." Then there will be
practically an infinity of things of which "animal" is the substance,
since it is not in an accidental sense that "man" is derived from
"animal."Again, the
Absolute Animal will be a plurality. For (a) the "animal" in each
species will be the substance of that species, since the species is
called after it and no other thing. Otherwise "man" would be derived
from that other thing, which would be the genus of "man." (b) Further,
all the constituents of "man" will be Ideas. Then, since nothing can
be the Idea of one thing and the substance of another (for this is
impossible),each
and every "animal" in the various species will be the Absolute
Animal.
Further, from what will
these Forms be derived, and how can they be derived from the Absolute
Animal? Or how can "the animal," whose very essence is "animal," exist
apart from the Absolute Animal? And further, in the case of sensible
things both these and still more absurd consequences follow. If, then,
these consequences are impossible, clearly there are not Forms of
sensible things in the sense in which some hold that there
are.
[20]
Since
substance is of two kinds, the concrete thing and the formula (I mean
that one kind of substance is the formula in combination with the
matter, and the other is the formula in its full sense), substances in
the former sense admit of destruction, for they also admit of
generation. But the formula does not admit of destruction in the sense
that it is ever
being destroyed, since neither does it so
admit of generation (for the essence of house is not generated, but
only the essence of
this house); formulae
are , and
are not, independently of
generation and destruction; for it has been shown
56 that no one either generates or
creates them.For this
reason also there is no definition or demonstration of particular
sensible substances, because they contain matter whose nature is such
that it can both exist and not exist. Hence all the individual
instances of them are perishable.If, then, the demonstration and definition of
necessary truths requires scientific knowledge, and if, just as
knowledge cannot be sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance (it is
opinion that is of this nature), so too demonstration and definition
cannot vary (it is opinion that is concerned with that which can be
otherwise than it is)—
[
1040a]
[1]
then clearly there
can be neither definition nor demonstration of individual sensible
substances.For (a)
things which perish are obscure to those who have knowledge of them
when they are removed from the sphere of their perception, and (b)
even though their formulae are preserved in the soul, there will no
longer be either definition or demonstration of them. Therefore in
cases relating to definition, when we are trying to define any
individual, we must not fail to realize that our definition may always
be upset; because it is impossible to define these things.
Nor, indeed, can any Idea be defined; for the Idea is an individual,
as they say, and separable; and the formula must consist of words, and
the man who is defining must not coin a word, because it would not be
comprehensible. But the words which are in use are common to all the
things which they denote; and so they must necessarily apply to
something else as well. E.g., if a man were to define you, he would
say that you are an animal which is lean or white or has some other
attribute, which will apply to something else as well.And if it should be said that
there is no reason why all the attributes separately should not belong
to several things, and yet in combination belong to this alone, we
must reply, (1.) that they also belong to both the elements; e.g.,
"two-footed animal" belongs both to "animal" and to "two-footed" (and
in the case of eternal elements this is even necessarily so; since
they are prior to the compound, and parts of it.Indeed they are also separable, if the
term "man" is separable—for either neither can be separable,
or both are so.
[20]
If neither,
the genus will not exist apart from the species, or if it is so to
exist, so will the differentia); (2.) that "animal" and "two-footed"
are prior in being to "two-footed animal," and that which is prior to
something else is not destroyed together with it.
Again,
if the Ideas are composed of Ideas (for constituents are less
composite than that which they compose), still the elements of which
the Idea is composed (e.g. "animal" and "two-footed") will have to be
predicated of many particulars. Otherwise, how can they be known? For
there would be an Idea which cannot be predicated of more than one
thing. But this is not considered possible; every Idea is thought to
admit of participation.
Thus, as we have said,
57 the impossibility of
defining individuals is hard to realize when we are dealing with
eternal entities, especially in the case of such as are unique, e.g.
the sun and moon. For people go wrong not only by including in the
definition attributes on whose removal it will still be
sun—e.g., "that which goes round the earth," or
"night-hidden " (for they suppose that if it stops or becomes
visible
58 it will no longer be sun; but it is absurd that this
should be so, since "the sun "denotes a definite
substance)—they also mention attributes which may apply to
something else; e.g., if another thing with those attributes comes
into being, clearly it will be a sun. The formula, then, is general;
[
1040b]
[1]
but the sun was supposed to be an
individual, like Cleon or
Socrates.Why does not one of the exponents of the Ideas
produce a definition of them? If they were to try, it would become
obvious that what we have just said is true.
It is
obvious that even of those things which are thought to be substances
the majority are potentialities; both the parts of living things (for
none of them has a separate substantial existence; and when they are
separated, although they still exist, they exist as matter), and
earth, fire and air; for none of these is one
thing
—they are a mere aggregate before they are digested and some
one thing is generated from them.It might be supposed very reasonably that the
parts of living things and the corresponding parts of their vital
principle are both, i.e. exist both actually and potentially, because
they contain principles of motion derived from something in their
joints; and hence some animals
59 live even when they are
divided. Nevertheless it is only potentially that all of them will
exist when they are one and continuous by nature and not by force or
concretion; for this sort of thing is malformation.
60And since "unity" has the same
variety of senses as "being," and the substance of Unity is one, and
things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one,
evidently neither Unity nor Being can be the substance of things, just
as neither "being an element" or "principle" can be the
substance;
[20]
but we ask
what the principle is so that we may refer to something more
intelligible.
61Now of these concepts Being
and Unity are more nearly substance than are principle, element and
cause; but not even the former are quite substance, since nothing else
that is common is substance; for substance belongs to nothing except
itself and that which contains it and of which it is the
substance.Again,
Unity cannot exist in many places at the same time, but that which is
common is present in many things at the same time. Hence it is clear
that no universal exists in separation apart from its particulars. The
exponents of the Forms are partly right in their account when they
make the Forms separate; that is, if the Forms are substances, but
they are also partly wrong, since by "Form" they mean the
"one-over-many."
62The reason for this is that they cannot explain what are the
imperishable substances of this kind which exist besides particular
sensible substances; so they make them the same in kind as perishable
things (for these we know); i.e., they make "Ideal Man" and "Ideal
Horse," adding the word "Ideal" to the names of sensible
things.However, I
presume that even if we had never seen the stars,
[
1041a]
[1]
none
the less there would be eternal substances besides those which we
knew; and so in the present case even if we cannot apprehend what they
are, still there must be eternal substances of some kind.
It is clear, then, both that no universal
term is substance and that no substance is composed of
substances.
As for what and what sort of thing we
mean by substance, let us explain this by making, as it were, another
fresh start. Perhaps in this way we shall also obtain some light upon
that kind of substance which exists in separation from sensible
substances. Since, then, substance is a kind of principle and cause,
we had better pursue our inquiry from this point.
Now when we ask why a thing is, it is always in the
sense "why does A belong to B?"To ask why the cultured man is a cultured man
is to ask either, as we have said, why the man is cultured, or
something else. Now to ask why a thing is itself is no question;
because when we ask the reason of a thing the fact must first be
evident; e.g., that the moon suffers eclipse;and "because it is itself" is the one
explanation and reason which applies to all questions such as "why is
man man?" or "why is the cultured person cultured?" (unless one were
to say that each thing is indivisible from itself, and that this is
what "being one" really means);
[20]
but this, besides being a general answer, is a
summary one.
63 We may, however, ask why a man is
an animal of such-and-such a kind.It is clear, then, that we are not asking why
he who is a man is a man; therefore we are asking why A, which is
predicated of B, belongs to B. (The fact that A does belong to B must
be evident, for if this is not so, the question is pointless.) E.g.,
"Why does it thunder?" means "why is a noise produced in the clouds?"
for the true form of the question is one thing predicated in this way
of another.Or again, "why
are these things, e.g. bricks and stones, a house?" Clearly then we
are inquiring for the cause (i.e., to speak abstractly, the essence);
which is in the case of some things, e.g. house or bed, the
end , and in others the prime mover—for this
also is a cause. We look for the latter kind of cause in the case of
generation and destruction, but for the former also in the case of
existence.
What we are now looking for is most
obscure when one term is not predicated of another;
[
1041b]
[1]
e.g. when we inquire what man is; because the
expression is a simple one not analyzed into subject and attributes.
We must make the question articulate before we ask it; otherwise we
get something which shares the nature of a pointless and of a definite
question.Now since
we must know that the fact actually exists, it is surely clear that
the question is "why is the
matter so-and-so?" e.g. "why
are these materials a house?" Because the essence of house is present
in them. And this matter, or the body containing this particular form,
is man. Thus what we are seeking is the cause (i.e. the form) in
virtue of which the matter is a definite thing; and this is the
substance of the thing.
Clearly then in
the case of simple entities
64 inquiry and explanation are impossible; in
such cases there is a different mode of inquiry.
Now
since that which is composed of something in such a way that the whole
is a unity; not as an aggregate is a unity, but as a syllable is
65—the syllable is not the letters, nor
is BA the same as B and A; nor is flesh fire and earth; because after
dissolution the compounds, e.g. flesh or the syllable, no longer
exist; but the letters exist, and so do fire and earth.Therefore the syllable is some
particular thing; not merely the letters, vowel and consonant, but
something else besides. And flesh is not merely fire and earth, or hot
and cold, but something else besides.Since then this something else must be either
an element or composed of elements,
[20]
(a) if it is an element, the same argument applies
again; for flesh will be composed of
this and fire and
earth, and again of another element, so that there will be an infinite
regression. And (b) if it is composed of elements, clearly it is
composed not of one (otherwise it will itself be that element) but of
several; so that we shall use the same argument in this case as about
the flesh or the syllable.It would seem, however, that this "something else" is something that
is not an element, but is the cause that
this matter is
flesh and
that matter a syllable, and similarly in other
cases.And this is
the substance of each thing, for it is the primary cause of its
existence. And since, although some things are not substances, all
substances are constituted in accordance with and by nature, substance
would seem to be this "nature," which is not an element but a
principle.
66 An
element is that which is present as matter in a thing, and into which
the thing is divided; e.g., A and B are the elements of the
syllable.